由道德範疇論休謨學說的情感特質

On Hume's Moral Theory of Sentiment

10.30114/CGJHSS.200904.0006

洪櫻芬(Ing-Fen Hong)

休謨 ； 情感 ； 道德 ； 習慣 ； 感覺 ； Hume ； Sentiment ； Morality ； Habit ； Sensation

長庚人文社會學報

2卷1期（2009 / 04 / 01）

147 - 164

繁體中文

在日常生活中，我們可明確感知到感覺和情感之不同。對休謨來說，感覺是純經驗性的感官感覺，情感則帶有反省性的思緒，我們所以爲的因果必然性，此必然性的觀念純粹來自於情感，這種與必然性連結的普遍情境，休謨稱之爲「習慣」。而道德之判定，亦是由情感之苦樂感受而來，訴諸於人的情感反應，也就是所謂的「贊同」(approbation)與否，藉由主體直接感受到的快樂特質，就可判斷其道德價值。在人的情感中有平靜情感與猛烈情感，平靜的情感幫助人超脫情欲之誘惑，有助於美德之提昇。道德的贊同本身是一種情感的平靜形式。行爲之對錯，其實是我們對此行爲的贊同與否之感受，而道德情感是如此感受中的一環，是普遍的人類本性。本文擬由「感覺、情感和習慣」、「奠基於情感的道德原則」以及「道德情感之特質」三大面向，希冀能對休謨的道德情感有更深切的瞭解。

Apparently, sensation and sentiment are different in our daily life. According to Hume, sensation is experienced sense, and sentiment is reflected and complex feeling. Causality doesn't exist in reality of experience, but is purely from sentiment. What we believe in causality, in Hume's perspective, is called ＜||＞habit.＜||＞ Judgment of morality is decided according to the subject's sense of pleasure, which is expressed through sentiment. Therefore, moral value is based on the subject's approbation of good and evil, which is judged according to the subject's sentiment. Passion-one way to manifest moral sentiment, includes calm passion and violent passion. Calm passion helps human-beings purify themselves from temptation of lust and promotes their virtue. Moral approbation is a kind of calm passion. One's judgment on right or wrong of people's behaviors is all related with his moral approbation. Moral sentiment, coming from human nature, is one of the elements of moral approbation. In this paper, three perspectives are discussed: (1) sensation, sentiment, and habit; (2) the framework of moral sentiment; and (3) characteristics of moral sentiment. Through these perspectives, the researcher aims to clarify Hume's thesis of sentiment in moral's realm.

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