法制規範下之公司治理效益－以審計及薪酬委員會為例

Benefits of Enforced Corporate Governance: Focus on Audit Committee and Compensation Committee

李坤璋(Kuen-Chang Lee)；陳元保(Yen-Pao Chen)；王麗莉(Li-Li Wang)

審計委員會 ； 薪酬委員會 ； 公司價值 ； Audit Committee ； Compensation Committee ； Company Value ； Corporate Governance

會計學報

7卷2期（2017 / 11 / 01）

1 - 31

繁體中文

本研究以臺灣上市（櫃）公司為研究對象，研究期間自2006年至2012年共7個年度，以公司設置審計委員會及薪酬委員會之情形，運用複迴歸分析探討法制化的規範對公司治理效益之影響。本研究以公司價值做為公司治理效益之代理變數，實證結果發現，公司為遵循政府法令設置薪酬委員會，該委員會之設置與公司價值兩者間成顯著負相關，而公司自願設置審計委員會與公司價值雖亦為負相關，但未達統計上顯著水準；另設置薪酬委員會與公司規模之交乘變項，對公司價值呈現顯著正相關；顯示政府強制上市（櫃）公司設立薪酬委員會，可能使大企業發揮效益，而對小企業則產生過高的法令遵循成本，進而有損公司價值。此外，為瞭解董事、監察人及高階經理人酬勞給付與公司績效之關連合理性，本研究針對資產報酬率變動比率與前述人員薪酬變動比率之相關性進行探討，依實證迴歸結果顯示，兩者雖有正相關，但未達統計顯著水準，此情況於公司依法設置薪酬委員會後，其結果亦同，政府強制上市（櫃）公司設置薪酬委員會之立法美意，目前似乎尚未產生效益，其長期影響仍有待觀察。

These study objects are the listed companies in Taiwan. The study period is seven years from 2006 to 2012. To explore the effect of legalization on the efficiency of corporate governance by using complex regression analysis, thinking of the situation when set up the Audit Committee and the Compensation Committee. This study takes the company value as the proxy variable of corporate governance benefits. The result show that the company sets up a Compensation Committee for compliance with government decrees. There is a significant negative correlation between the setting of the committee and the value of the firm. The company's voluntary setting of the audit committee is negatively related to the value of the company, but not statistically significant. The cross variable of setting the Compensation Committee and the size of the company showed a significant positive correlation with the value of the company. The government forces a listed company to set up a Compensation Committee, which may make the big business effective but make small businesses cost too high to comply with the law, thereby undermining the value of the company. In addition, in order to understand the relationship between directors, supervisors and senior managers of remuneration and corporate performance of the relevance of rationality. This study examines the correlation between the rate of return on return on assets and the rate of change in remuneration. There is a positive correlation between the two, but not statistically significant level. After the company set up the Compensation Committee, the result is the same. The government's intention to set up a Compensation Committee for the listed company is not yet profitable, and its long-term impact remains to be seen.

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