不完全資訊審計賽局之策略分析

A Strategic Analysis in an Incomplete Information Auditing Game

10.30142/RAAS.201206.0004

邱士宗(Shih-Tsung Chiu)

審計 ； 賽局 ； 均衡 ； 處罰 ； 精煉 ； Auditing ； Game ； Equilibrium ； Penalty ； Refinement

會計審計論叢

2卷1期（2012 / 06 / 01）

91 - 129

繁體中文

本研究以不完全資訊賽局模式來研究管理者與審計人員間之策略互動。該主題過去之分析性研究往往把焦點放在提高審計人員之法律責任是否能給審計人員提高努力之動機從而提升會計資訊之品質。本研究在模式中另外考慮當管理者錯誤報導時將承擔之處罰，並研究其對均衡造成之影響。研究結果發現，若想要達到使審計人員付出高努力之均衡，單靠提高對審計人員之處罰不一定有用，我們必須同時設定管理者與審計人員之適當處罰才能有效地提升審計人員之努力。另外，本研究用了較多之均衡精煉以過濾出同時兼具合理性與穩定性之均衡。這些也是在過往相關研究所未曾用過的。

This paper uses an incomplete information game-theoretical model to study the interaction between managers and auditors. Previous analytical research about this topic usually focuses mainly on whether raising auditors' legal liability can give auditors incentives to provide more effort and increase the quality of accounting information. We further consider the penalties on managers' misreporting and investigate their effect on the equilibria. Our results show that the equilibrium containing auditors' high effort might not be attained by simply raising the punishments on them. Instead, we have to set the penalties on both parties properly to induce auditors' effort effectively. Besides, this paper uses more equilibrium refinements to find out the equilibria which are both reasonable and stable. This has never been used in the previous research.

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