外部聘僱機會對高階經理人股票選擇權的影響

The Effect of Outside Employment Opportunities on Executive Stock Options

林宜勉(Yi-Mien Lin)；簡秀芳(Hsiu-Fang Chien)

外部聘僱機會 ； 股票選擇權 ； 經理人異動 ； 經理人技能 ； 運氣（產業景氣） ； Outside employment opportunity ； Stock options ； Executive's turnover ； Executives' skills ； Luck

會計審計論叢

5卷2期（2015 / 12 / 01）

57 - 86

英文

本文檢視高階經理人外部聘僱機會和高階經理人的技能及公司績效之間的關係，同時探討高階經理人薪酬在不同市場景氣狀況的結果。本研究的貢獻在於了解高階經理人的運氣及技能如何影響他們做離職或留職的決定及股票選擇權的策略。實證結果發現，愈有經驗且對公司有愈多專業貢獻的高階經理人愈少被裁員或自願離職，高階經理人的離職和運氣（產業景氣）無關。同時，高階經理人有較高的專業經驗可以得到較高的薪酬，但年紀較大則否。經理人的運氣和薪酬無關，顯示出專業技能為影響薪酬最重要的因素。經營績效較差的高階經理人得到較少的薪酬，此時，高階經理人也較容易操作盈餘管理。

This paper examines the relationship between executives' outside employment opportunities and executive skills or firm performance, and looks at the effect of executive employment compensation on different market conditions. Our contribution is to discover how executives' luck and skill affect their leave-or-stay decisions and their options in exercising strategies. We find that experienced executives and those with greater professional affiliation with firms are less likely to be fired or sent on voluntary leave, and that executive leave is unrelated to luck. Moreover, we find that executives with more professional experience can obtain greater compensation, but that this compensation is not necessarily acquired by older executives. Executives with a poor operating performance relative to other firms in the same industry obtain less compensation. There is no relationship between an executive's luck and compensation; we find that an executive's skill is the most important factor influencing compensation. Furthermore, executives are more likely to perform earnings management to grant stock options under bad luck or poor operating performance.

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