Anti-Hedging Policies and the Executive Equity-Based Compensation

禁止避險政策對高階主管薪酬之影響

李艷榕(Yen-Jung Lee)；沈信漢(Carl Hsin-Han Shen)

Anti-hedging policies ； Executive compensation ； Stock options ； Restricted stock ； 禁止避險政策 ； 經理人薪酬 ； 股票選擇權 ； 限制型股票

會計審計論叢

9卷2期（2019 / 12 / 01）

25 - 54

英文

Prior literature documents that some managers use derivative instruments to hedge their equity incentives and this practice has become more prevalent in recent years. When managers hedged their equity incentives, their pay-performance sensitivity is impaired. Some firms adopt anti-hedging policies that prohibit insiders from engaging in derivative transactions to undo the risk incentives their firms impose on them. Using U.S. firms that implement anti-hedging policies between 1993 and 2012, we find that the relation between equity incentives and firm performance is strengthened after firms implement anti-hedging policies. The relation between equity incentives and firm performance does not have a similar change during the same period for firms that do not implement anti-hedging policies. Moreover, the increase in incentive-performance link is more pronounced for firms that adopt stricter anti-hedging policies banning the use of ANY derivatives to hedge. Consistent with the notion that firms increase the use of the compensation vehicle with improved efficacy, we document that firms grant more restricted stock but not stock options after they implement anti-hedging policies. In contrast, the increased use of restricted stock is not observed in firms that do not adopt anti-hedging polices during the same period. Collectively, our evidence is consistent with implementing anti-hedging policies improves the efficacy of stock-based compensation.

以前文獻發現經理人會使用衍生性金融工具來規避權益薪酬誘因的風險，而且這種行為在近年來越來越盛行。當經理人規避他們手中持有的權益薪酬誘因之風險時，他們的薪酬績效敏感性即受到損害。有些公司實行禁止經理人避險政策以禁止內部人利用衍生性金融工具來消除公司加諸於經理人的權益薪酬風險誘因，本文使用1993到2012年間美國公司實行禁止經理人避險政策的情形來探討禁止經理人避險政策與對高階主管薪酬之影響，發現CEO之薪酬績效敏感度在公司實行禁止經理人避險政策之後有所增加，而此一敏感度在未實行禁止經理人避險政策的公司並無改變。CEO之薪酬績效敏感度的增加在禁止經理人避險政策嚴格禁止使用任何金融工具來避險的公司更為顯著。此外，在實行禁止經理人避險政策之後，公司會給與經理人更多限制型股票而非股票認股權，在未實行禁止經理人避險政策的公司則並無此現象，此一做法意味著公司增加使用更有效的薪酬工具。綜而言之，本文的證據顯示實行禁止經理人避險政策可能增加股票薪酬的有效性。

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