企業揭露品質與經理人能力之關聯：以強制管理階層盈餘預測修正為例

Corporate Disclosure Quality and Managerial Ability: Evidence from Mandatory Management Earnings Forecasts Revisions

潘健民(Chien-Min Kevin Pan)；黃郁茜(Yu-Chien Huang)

管理階層盈餘預測 ； 強制盈餘預測修正 ； 揭露品質 ； 經理人能力 ； Management earnings forecasts ； Mandatory earnings forecasts revisions ； Disclosure quality ； Managerial ability

會計審計論叢

11卷2期（2021 / 12 / 01）

43 - 83

繁體中文

回應Leuz and Wysocki（2016）所提出的後續研究建議（關於強制揭露是否達到當初立法所預設的實質效果，本研究以2005年至2019年之間於東京證券交易所列上市公司為研究對象，探討於強制性修正盈餘預測的環境之中，企業揭露品質與經理人能力之關聯性。東京證券交易所鼓勵企業發布盈餘預測，日本金融商品交易法也強制企業在預見重大變動時，修正先前所發布之盈餘預測；此種發布經理人財務預測的強制揭露環境，是其他先進國家少見的制度。本研究分別採用「盈餘預測修正次數多寡」和「是否於最後一刻修正盈餘預測」（以會計年度結束後至發布下一年度盈餘預測之期間計算）作為衡量企業揭露品質的指標。實證結果發現，經理人能力越佳，不僅越有可能多次修正盈餘預測，同時也越有可能在最後一刻修正盈餘預測。後續研究分析進一步發現，只有經理人能力較好的公司比較可能在最後一刻修正盈餘預測。因為最後一刻的盈餘預測修正不具即時性而被先前文獻視為揭露品質較差的證據，然而依據本研究之實證數據，結果顯示經理人能力較好的公司，其揭露品質反而較差。

Echo Leuz and Wysocki (2016) who call for more research on the real effects of disclosure because of little evidence of whether mandatory disclosure achieves the desired effects, using data from firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2019, this study examines this paper investigates the association between disclosure quality and managerial ability where the management earnings forecasts revisions are mandatory. Listing firms in Japan are strongly encouraged by the Tokyo Stock Exchange to provide next year's management earnings forecasts. Once forecasts are issued, firms are required by the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act to immediately revise previous issued forecasts when they foresee any significant changes in earnings. This paper uses two measures as proxies for the firm's disclosure quality: (1) how often a firm revises its previous earnings forecasts; and (2) whether a firm issues last minute revisions between the end of fiscal year and the announcement of its earnings forecasts for the next fiscal year. The results show that firms with higher managerial ability are more likely to provide frequent revisions to their earnings forecasts, and are also more likely to revise earnings forecasts at the last minute. This study further finds that only firms with higher managerial abilities are more likely to revise earnings forecasts at the last minute. Prior study considers last minute revision as a less timely disclosure hence worse quality; therefore, empirical results of this study suggests that firms with worse disclosure quality have higher managerial abilities.

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