Family-Controlled Firms, Directors' & Officers' Insurance Coverage, and the Use of Derivatives

家族控制公司、董監事暨重要職員責任保險與衍生性金融商品使用程度

Ching-Lung Chen(陳慶隆)；Chao-Jung Pan(潘昭容)；Hung-Shu Fan(范宏書)

Family-controlled firms ； Derivatives usage ； Directors' & officers' insurance (D&O) ； Risk-averseness ； 家族控制公司 ； 衍生性金融商品使用程度 ； 董監事暨重要職員責任保險 ； 規避風險

會計審計論叢

13卷1期（2023 / 06 / 01）

83 - 122

英文;繁體中文

Decision making in family-controlled firms typically entails a long time horizon because of the close ties between family wealth and the business, and because of the intention to pass the firm on to the next generation. Family owners may focus more on family control in addition to the survival of the family business, thereby becoming even more risk-averse. This study examines whether the risk management practices of family-controlled firms are associated with higher (lower) levels of hedging (trading) derivatives usage. Note that directors' & officers' insurance limits expected legal liabilities, which in turn encourages managers to take more risks. This study further examines the moderating role of directors' & officers' insurance on family-controlled firms' derivatives usage. The empirical results document that family-controlled firms are associated with higher (lower) levels of hedging (trading) derivatives usage than firms that are not controlled by a specific family. Further evidence reveals that these results are particularly pronounced for family-controlled firms without directors' & officers' insurance coverage, suggesting that directors' & officers' insurance coverage mitigates family-controlled firms' being even more risk-averse through the use of derivatives. This study performs several diagnostic tests and reveals the results are robust in various specifications.

家族企業之家族財富與公司資產緊密聯繫，亦有企圖將公司傳承給其後代。故家族企業制定決策時，會著重於永續經營與家族控制，導致其有規避風險之傾向。爰此，本文旨在檢視家族控制公司是否有較高（低）的避險（交易）目的衍生性金融商品使用程度。此外，董監事暨重要職員責任保險在某種程度可限制公司管理者的預期法律責任，使管理者較願意從事具風險性的活動，故本文進一步檢測此責任保險在家族控制公司的衍生性金融商品使用決策上所扮演的角色。實證結果顯示：相較於非家族控制公司，家族控制公司使用較多（少）的避險（交易）目的之衍生性金融商品，且此現象在未投保董監事暨重要職員責任保險之情況下更為明顯。就衍生性金融商品使用決策而言，前述實證結果隱含投保責任保險可減緩家族企業較多規避風險之行為。本文進行若干額外測試，發現上述實證結果具相當穩固性。

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