公司治理評鑑機制對公司績效及關鍵查核事項揭露之影響：董事會政治連結的調節效果

The Influence of Corporate Governance Evaluation Mechanism on Firm Performance and Key Audit Matters Disclosure: The Moderating Effect of Board Political Connections

呂瑞芳(Jei-Fang Lew)；劉怡莉(I-Li Liu)

董事會政治連結 ； 公司治理評鑑 ； 公司績效 ； 關鍵查核事項 ； 內生性 ； Board political connection ； Corporate governance evaluation ； Firm performance ； Key audit matters ； Endogeneity

會計審計論叢

13卷1期（2023 / 06 / 01）

123 - 171

繁體中文;英文

董事會是企業內部公司治理機制的核心，過去文獻大多支持公司治理評鑑愈佳的企業，其公司績效及財務報導品質愈佳。當企業聘任政治人物擔任董事，看重其政商關係可以將關係資產轉化為經濟資產，為企業帶來外部資源。然而，透過政商關係，進而對公司產生影響而謀取私利，則非社會大眾所樂見。本研究探討政治連結董事對公司治理與公司績效及公司治理與會計師關鍵查核事項揭露之關聯性的調節效果。實證結果顯示政治連結董事會透過自身之政治連結謀取私利而破壞公司治理機制，將董事會形式化，因代理衝突而產生較高的代理成本，造成公司績效下降，對公司治理與公司績效之關聯性產生調節效果。政治連結董事亦會為隱藏透過政治關係而謀取的資源，干涉公司財務報導揭露方式，導致盈餘品質低落，會計師在評估審計風險下，認為必要提供較完整的資訊，因此關鍵查核事項的項目及字數愈多，對公司治理與關鍵查核事項揭露之關聯性產生調節效果。

The board of directors is the core of the internal mechanism of corporate governance, most of the past literature supports that companies with better corporate governance evaluation have better firm performance and financial reporting quality. When a company appoints a politician as a director, valuing its political and business relationship can transform relationship assets into economic assets and bring external resources to the company. However, it is not acceptable to the public to seek personal gain through political and business relations, and then exert influence on the company. This study explores the moderating effect of politically connected directors on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, and between corporate governance and accountants' disclosure of key audit matters. The empirical results show that politically connected directors will use their own political connections to seek personal gain and destroy the corporate governance mechanism, formalize the board of directors, generate higher agency costs due to agency conflicts, cause firm performance to decline, and moderate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. In order to hide the resources obtained through political connections, they interfere with the way to disclose the company's financial reports, resulting in low earnings quality. Accountants consider it necessary to provide more complete information when assessing audit risks, so the more items and words of key audit matters, and then cause a moderating effect on the relationship between corporate governance and the disclosure of key audit matters.

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