题名

Do Investors Value Information About in the Money/Out of the Money Stock Options Differently?

DOI

10.6292/AFPF.2012.05.06

作者

Tania Morris；Aurélie Desfleurs；Sylvie Berthelot

关键词

Executive Stock-Options ； Value Relevance ； Private Information ； Financial Markets ； Insider Transactions

期刊名称

Advances in Financial Planning and Forecasting

卷期/出版年月

5期（2012 / 12 / 01）

页次

149 - 170

内容语文

英文
英文摘要

The present study examines the information conveyed to investors through the holding of stock options by executives. In other words, we try to answer the following question: When corporate executives hold stock options that are, on average, either in the money or out of the money, do these holdings convey information to the market? We also examine the differences between the firms' characteristics in both types of situations. When a firm's executive stock options (ESOs) are on average in the money, the results indicate that the market attaches a positive value to the spread size and the number of options outstanding. Furthermore, the importance investor's grant to executives' holding out of the money stock options is far less pronounced. In fact, when a firm's ESOs are on average out of the money, the results tend to show that investors attach value only to the number of options in circulation. Thus, overall, out of the money ESOs do not seem to convey the same information to financial markets as in the money ESOs. Moreover, firms with in the money ESOs are much larger in scale, profitable, and spend less on research and development than firms with out of the money ESOs.
主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
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被引用次数
  1. 盧思薇(2017)。論跨國爭端解決機制之設計與選擇—以澳洲菸草素面包裝法爭端案件為核心。清華大學科技法律研究所學位論文。2017。1-184。
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