题名

The Relationship between Top Executive Compensation and Negative Earnings: Contracting Efficiency and Managerial Entrenchment

并列篇名

高階主管薪酬與負盈餘關係之研究：訂約效率與管理者利益掠奪之觀點

DOI

10.6538/TAR.2007.0602.04

作者

蔡柳卿(Liu-Ching Tsai)

关键词

高階主管薪酬 ； 負盈餘 ； 訂約效率 ； 管理者利益掠奪 ； 公司治理 ； Top executive compensation ； Negative earnings ； Contracting efficiency ； Managerial entrenchment ； Corporate governance

期刊名称

中華會計學刊

卷期/出版年月

6卷2期（2007 / 04 / 01）

页次

209 - 239

内容语文

英文
中文摘要

過去已有許多文獻證實薪酬與盈餘間的關係。雖然會計盈餘扮演了重要的契約角色，但Hall and Liebman（1998）指出薪酬績效敏感性偏低，Leone et al.（2003）認為可能是研究者以線性模式來分析薪酬與績效間的非線性關係所致。Gaver and Gaver（1998）已發現薪酬委員會並未以對稱的方式，去處理類似交易的利得或損失型態。其證據顯示，當盈餘為正時，現金薪酬顯著地和底線盈餘成正相關，但當盈餘為負時則否。作者解釋：當管理者採取改善公司未來前景、但會產生當期損失的活動時，董事會希望藉由設計不對稱的盈餘薪酬權數，來保障其免於受到薪酬調降的懲罰，提高風險分攤效率。但作者亦承認此證據亦可能和管理者利益掠奪有關。Cheng（2003）提供證據證實負盈餘權數的降低和管理者利益掠奪有關，本研究則同時考量訂約效率和管理利利益掠奪兩種潛在誘因，並進一步考量公司治理的角色。簡言之，本研究之目的有以下三個。，首先係探討國內董事會在決定正、負盈餘的薪酬權數上是否會有不對稱的處理，亦即是否會降低負盈餘薪酬權數來給予管理者薪酬保障。其次，本研究探討此一薪酬保障行為的潛在誘因為何？第一，公司成長機會及環境不確定性導致的工作風險是否為此一管理者薪酬保障行為的影響因子，而這和效率的風險分攤或取得人力資本有關；第二，此一負盈餘薪酬權數降低，是否是管理者運用影響力遂行自利之行為，此即管理者利益掠奪行為。最後，本研究第三個目的，即探討治理機制對於「降低負盈餘薪酬權數」之效率訂約誘因與管理者利益掠奪誘因的影響。經由文獻探討及相關理論，本研究發展以下假說：假說一：總經理薪酬中的負盈餘薪酬權數相較正盈餘而言較低。假說二：「降低負盈餘薪酬權數之程度」與公司的成長機會成正向關係。假說三：「降低負盈餘薪酬權數之程度」與公司的環境不確定性成正向關係。假說四：「降低負盈餘薪酬權數之程度」與管理者影響力成正向關係。假說五：相對於治理結構不佳的公司而言，治理結構較佳公司「降低負盈餘薪酬權數之薪酬保障效果」與公司投資機會之關係較強。假說六：相對於治理結構不佳的公司而言，治理結構較佳公司「降低負盈餘薪酬權數之薪酬保障效果」與環境不確定性之關係較強。假說七：相對於治理結構不佳的公司而言，治理結構較佳公司「降低負盈餘薪酬權數之薪酬保障效果」與管理者影響力的關係較弱。本研究實證結果發現，公司決定總經理薪酬時，其負盈餘薪酬權數顯著低於正盈餘薪酬權數，同時，此一統計證據在研究期間內各年度裏尚稱穩定，與Gaver and Gaver（1998）及Cheng（2003）的發現相同。本研究也發現，公司降低負盈餘薪酬權數（相對於正盈餘薪酬權數而言）的程度，係隨著公司投資機會、環境不確定性以及管理者影響力的差異而有不同。當公司投資機會及環境不確定性愈高時，顯示管理者承擔較高的工作風險，故董事會會藉由降低負盈餘薪酬權數，來提高管理者與股東間的風險分攤效率，俾吸引留住人才或激勵其專注於長期導向的努力。同時，當管理者影響力較大時，管理者亦會影響董事會薪酬決定過程，藉此薪酬保障作法來掠奪股東利益。本研究最後亦發現當公司治理有效性較高時，該公司治理機制較會發揮積極的監督效果，愈會視管理者的工作風險來合理設計其薪酬因素之權數，同時對於管理者運用權勢保障自身薪酬免受虧損懲罰之自利行為，會產生抑制作用。而當治理有效性較低時，則可觀察到管理者薪酬中負盈餘權數降低和管理者工作風險較無關，而和管理者影響力有關，此即顯示管理者利用較弱的監督機制，遂行其薪酬保障的利益掠奪行為。本研究具有一些貢獻。過去已有國內、外文獻探討負盈餘的評價角色，本研究則從契約觀點探討負盈餘的薪酬角色，此證據可以補充關於高階主管薪酬與盈餘關係的相關文獻。本研究也進一步對於負盈餘薪酬權數降低的薪酬保障行為，是否和訂約效率或是管理者自利有關來提供解釋，延伸Gaver and Gaver（1998）及Cheng（2003）的研究。另一方面，本研究也補充了公司治理文獻。Hartzell and Starks（2003）發現，較低度的機構投資者股權集中度，和較高的管理者薪酬與較低的薪酬績效敏感性有關；Core et al.（1999）也發現管理者會利用較弱的治理機制來攫取超額報酬。不同於他們著眼於薪酬水準及誘因強度之決策，本研究從調整負盈餘薪酬權數的薪酬決策出發，發現有效的公司治理下機制可以抑制管理者的利益掠奪行為，同時也較能視管理者工作風險訂定最適契約。這些證據不僅補充相關文獻，可提供主管機關建置公司治理準則的參考，並據以建議投資人視公司治理之良窳，判斷公司之薪酬制定的有效性。
英文摘要

This paper investigates whether less compensation weight is placed on negative earnings than on positive earnings in determining top executive compensation, shielding executive compensation from loss. In addition, this paper examines whether the shielding behavior is consistent with the contracting efficiency hypothesis, which contends the purpose of shielding is to enhance risk-sharing between the managers and shareholders, or with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, which contends that entrenched managers influence their own pay arrangements to favor themselves. Accordingly, it is expected that executive job risk and managerial influence are positively related to degree of shielding. Finally, according to agency theory, stronger governance structure is expected to set up incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk orientation of agents to align them with the interests of principals, and it also can reduce the degree of shielding resulting from managerial influence. Investigating a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 1999 through 2003, our empirical results support each of the hypotheses of this paper.
主题分类 社會科學 > 財金及會計學
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被引用次数
  1. 蔡柳卿、楊朝旭、許慧雯(2012)。高階管理團隊薪酬對資產減損敏感度之實證研究。中華會計學刊，8(2)，165-216。
  2. 謝佳純、梁書瑋、吳幸蓁(2014)。薪酬委員會之設置及其品質對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響。中華會計學刊，10(2)，135-188。
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