题名

實質盈餘管理、錯誤評價與董事會特性

并列篇名

Real Earnings Management, Misvaluation, and Board Characteristics

DOI

10.6538/TAR.2013.0902.02

作者

薛敏正(Min-Jeng Shiue);曾乾豪(Chien-Hao Tseng)

关键词

錯誤評價 ; 實質盈餘管理 ; 裁決性應計數 ; 公司治理 ; misevaluation ; real earnings management ; discretionary accruals ; corporate governance

期刊名称

中華會計學刊

卷期/出版年月

9卷2期(2013 / 07 / 01)

页次

191 - 220

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

本研究之目的在驗證實質盈餘管理、錯誤評價與董事會特性間之關聯。參考Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan(2005)與Chi and Gupta(2009)所採之權益價值高估值估計模式來衡量企業錯誤評價之情況。研究結果發現,前期錯誤評價會導致次期實質盈餘管理增加。雖然,本研究未發現董事會特性與實質盈餘管理間具有顯著關聯性,但部分證據顯示董事會特性可降低前期錯誤評價與實質盈餘管理間之關聯性。

英文摘要

This study examines the relationships among real earnings management, misvaluation, and board characteristics. We use the M/B decomposition model to estimate misvaluation following the models of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) and Chi and Gupta (2009). The results show that the prior period’s misvaluation is associated with higher levels of real earnings management. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that board characteristics can constrain real earnings management. However, we find some evidence that board characteristics could mitigate the relationship between the prior period’s misvaluation and real earnings management.

主题分类 社會科學 > 財金及會計學
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