相對績效評估與高階經理人薪酬：論企業生命週期之影響

Relative Performance Evaluation and Top Managers' Compensation: The Effect of the Firm Life Cycle

10.6538/TAR.2017.1302.01

陳欣妤(Hsin-Yu Chen)；邱耿中(Kenchung Chiu)

相對績效評估 ； 高階經理人薪酬 ； 現金紅利 ； 企業生命週期 ； relative performance evaluation ； top managers' compensation ； cash bonus ； firm life cycle

中華會計學刊

13卷2期（2017 / 12 / 01）

157 - 192

繁體中文

本研究檢驗高階經理人薪酬合約是否採用相對績效評估（Relative Performance Evaluation，簡稱RPE）及企業生命週期階段是否影響相對績效評估之採用。先前關於高階經理人薪酬合約是否採用RPE的文獻相當分歧，本研究以更精確的子產業分類重新檢驗高階經理人薪酬是否存在採用RPE的現象，以及RPE之採用是否受到企業生命週期之影響。本研究發現高階經理人總薪酬可能未採用RPE，但紅利薪酬則有，推論為紅利薪酬於期末決定，會進行同業比較，而同業績效已於期初影響高階經理人薪酬之設定，故本期高階經理人總薪酬與本期同業績效較無相關性。此外，也發現當企業生命週期於成長期或衰退期時，高階經理人現金紅利採用RPE情況並不顯著，但於成熟期時，因為市場競爭因素導致現金紅利有採用RPE情形。

This study examines the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) and whether firm life cycle stages affect the use of RPE. Prior empirical research still offers mixed evidence on the use of RPE in top managers' compensation because of rough industrial classification. Accordingly, we re-test the RPE argument by more precise industrial classification. We find that top managers' total compensation exhibits little use of RPE. However, RPE is more prevalent for top managers' profit sharing schemes. The explanation is that firms can incorporate peer performance to decide top managers' bonus at the end of the period and past peer performance have influenced top managers' fixed salary set at the beginning of the year. In addition, we find that firm In growth and decline stages, there is little evidence concerning the use of RPE in cash bonus. Conversely, RPE is used in determining top managers' cash bonus for firms in maturity stage because of more industrial competition.

1. 金成隆、林修葳、邱偉恒(2005)。研究發展支出與資本支出的價值攸關性：以企業生命週期論析。中山管理評論，13(3)，617-643。
   連結：
2. 金成隆、林修葳、紀信義(2004)。專利權的價值攸關性：從企業生命週期論析。管理學報，21(2)，175-197。
   連結：
3. 洪玉舜、王泰昌(2005)。績效衡量指標在高階主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要性。證券市場發展季刊，17(2)，35-100。
   連結：
4. 曹壽民、連威豪、劉奕孜(2010)。從企業生命週期探討應計項目異常現象。會計評論，51，107-142。
   連結：
5. 蔡柳卿(2006)。相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬：論產業競爭程度之影響。管理評論，25(1)，69-94。
   連結：
6. Adizes, I.(1988).Corporate Lifecycles: How and Why Corporations Grow and Die and What to Do About It.Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall.
7. Agarwal, R.,Sarkar, M.(2002).The conditioning effect of time on firm survival: An industry life cycle approach.The Academy of Management Journal,45(5),971-994.
8. Aggarwal, R.,Samwick, A.(1999).Executive compensation, strategic competition, and relative performance evaluation: Theory and evidence.The Journal of Finance,54(6),1999-2043.
9. Albuquerque, A.(2014).Do growth-option firms use less relative performance evaluation?.The Accounting Review,89(1),27-60.
10. Albuquerque, A.(2009).Peer firms in relative performance evaluation.Journal of Accounting and Economics,48(1),69-89.
11. Anthony, J.,Ramesh, K.(1992).Association between accounting performance measures and stock prices: A test of the life cycle hypothesis.Journal of Accounting and Economics,15(2-3),203-227.
12. Antle, R.,Smith, A.(1986).An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives.Journal of Accounting Research,24(1),1-39.
13. Banker, R. D.,Datar, S. M.(1998).Sensitivity, precision, and linear aggregation of signals for performance evaluation.Journal of Accounting Research,27(1),21-39.
14. Bannister, J. W.,Newman, H. A.(2003).Analysis of corporate disclosures on relative performance evaluation.Accounting Horizons,17(3),235-246.
15. Bhimani, A.(edited)(2006).Contemporary Issues in Management Accounting.New York, NY:Oxford University Press.
16. Black, E. L.(1998).Life-cycle impacts on the increment value-relevance of earnings and cash flow measure.Journal of Financial Statement Analysis,4(1),40-56.
17. Core, J. E.,Holthausen, R. W.,Larcker, D. F.(1999).Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance.Journal of Financial Economics,51(3),371-406.
18. DeFond, M. L.,Park, C. W.(1999).The effect of competition on CEO turnover.Journal of Accounting & Economics,27(1),35-56.
19. Dickinson, V.(2011).Cash flow patterns as a proxy for firm life cycle.The Accounting Review,86(6),1969-1994.
20. Faulkender, M.,Yang, J.(2010).Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups.Journal of Financial Economics,96(2),257-270.
21. Finkelstein, S.,Hambrick, D. C.(1989).Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes.Strategic Management Journal,10(1),121-134.
22. Garvey, G.,Milbourn, T.(2003).Incentive compensation when executives can hedge the market: Evidence of relative performance evaluation in the cross section.The Journal of Finance,58(4),1557-1582.
23. Gibbons, R.,Murphy, K. J.(1990).Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers.Industrial and Labor Relations Review,43(3),30-51.
24. Gong, G.,Li, L. Y.,Shin, J. Y.(2011).Relative performance evaluation and related peer groups in executive compensation contracts.The Accounting Review,86(3),1007-1043.
25. Gort, M.,Klepper, S.(1982).Time paths in the diffusion of product innovations.The Economic Journal,92(367),630-653.
26. Hayes, R. M.,Schaefer, S.(2009).CEO pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect.Journal of Financial Economics,94(2),280-290.
27. Holmstrom, B.(1979).Moral hazard and observability.The Bell Journal of Economics,10(1),74-91.
28. Holmstrom, B.(1982).Moral hazard in teams.The Bell Journal of Economics,13(2),324-340.
29. Janakiraman, S. N.,Lambert, R. A.,Larcker, D. F.(1992).An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation hypothesis.Journal of Accounting Research,30(1),53-69.
30. Jensen, M. C.,Meckling, W. H.(1976).Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure.Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360.
31. Jensen, M. C.,Murphy, K. J.(1990).Performance pay and top-management incentives.Journal of Political Economy,98(2),225-264.
32. Klepper, S.,Graddy, E.(1990).The evolution of new industries and the determinants of market structure.The RAND Journal of Economics,21(1),27-44.
33. Kren, L.(2000).Common uncertainty effects on the use of relative performance evaluation for corporate chief executives.Advances in Accounting,19(1),119-138.
34. Lynall, M. D.,Golden, B. R,Hillman, A. J.(2003).Board composition from adolescence to maturity: A multitheoretic view.The Academy of Management Review,28(3),416-431.
35. MacMillan, I. C.,Day, D. L.(1987).Corporate ventures into industrial markets: Dynamics of aggressive entry.Journal of Business Venturing,2(1),29-39.
36. Petersen, M. A.(2009).Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches.The Review of Financial Studies,22(1),435-480.
37. Porter, M. E.(1980).Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors.New York, NY:Free Press.
38. Prendergast, C.(1999).The provision of incentives in firm.Journal of Economic Literature,37(1),7-63.
39. Quinn, R. E.,Cameron, K.(1983).Organizational life cycles and shifting criteria of effectiveness: Some preliminary evidence.Management Science,29(1),33-51.
40. Rink, D. R.,Swan, J. E.(1979).Product life cycle research: A literature review.Journal of Business Research,7(3),219-242.
41. Sloan, R. G.(1993).Accounting earnings and top executive compensation.Journal of Accounting and Economics,16(1-3),55-100.
42. Smith, C. W.,Watts, R. L.(1992).The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies.Journal of Financial Economics,32(3),263-292.
43. Smith, K. G.,Mitchell, T. R.,Summer, C. E.(1985).Top level management priorities in different stages of the organization life cycle.The Academy of Management Journal,28(4),799-820.
44. Tsui, S.(2013).Arizona State University.
45. Warner, J. B.,Watts, R. L.,Wruck, K. H.(1988).Stock price and top management changes.Journal of Financial Economics,20,461-492.
46. 楊朝旭、黃潔(2004)。企業生命週期、資產組合與企業未來績效關連性之研究。商管科技季刊，5(1)，49-71。

1. 謝佑承,張雅淇(2021)。不同生命週期下核心代理問題對高階經理團隊薪酬之影響。會計評論，73，133-188。
2. 鍾旻純,潘虹華,廖懿屏(2019)。薪酬委員會之專業性與高階經理人薪酬相對績效評估。會計評論，68，119-159。