機構投資人、董事會結構、薪酬與關係人交易

Institutional Investors, Board Structure, Compensation and Related Party Transactions

10.6538/TAR.201807_14(1).0001

林穎芬(Ying-Fen Lin)；馮軒綾(Hsuan-Ling Feng)；洪鈺浩(Yu-Hao Hong)

關係人交易 ； 機構投資人 ； 董事會結構 ； 薪酬 ； related party transactions ； institutional investor ； board structure ； compensation

中華會計學刊

14卷1期（2018 / 07 / 01）

1 - 29

繁體中文;英文

許多公司不當使用關係人交易，將其視為利益輸送的管道，移轉利益給關係人，進而掏空公司資產。本研究以機構投資人、董事會特性及薪酬契約觀點來探討其對於關係人交易之影響，並檢測關係人交易運用程度是否影響公司績效。以2006年至2013年且有運用關係人交易之台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，主要研究結論為在董事會特性方面，董事會規模越大、獨立董事比例越低將不利於對關係人交易之監督，但薪酬契約對大部分的關係人交易能發揮監督能力；在外部監督方面，主動機構投資人持股越高，關係人交易運用程度越低，對於管理階層具有監督效果，而被動機構投資人持股與關係人交易之運用程度為正向關係；關係人交易運用程度越高，對公司未來營運績效有不利的影響。

Numerous companies improperly use related-party (RP) transactions, which are regarded as a method of transferring interest to stakeholders and then disposing the company's assets. This study investigated the influence of a monitoring mechanism and compensation on RP transactions from the perspectives of institutional investors, board structures, and compensation contracts. Furthermore, it explored whether considerable differences exist between the usage extent of RP transactions and company performance. The results indicated that a large board size and fewer independent members on the board are not beneficial for monitoring RP transactions. They also indicated that the compensation contracts can serve as a monitoring mechanism for RP transactions. Less RP transactions were observed for active institutional investors with high shareholding ratios. The shareholding ratios of passive institutional investors and the usage extent of RP transactions were found to be positively related. Furthermore, companies that frequently engaged in RP transactions demonstrated more unfavorable future performance.

1. 許智順,簡俱揚,黃媺婷,陳燕錫(2012)。產業專家會計師事務所對關係人交易之影響。商管科技季刊，13(2)，99-129。
   連結：
2. Almazan, A.,Hartzell, J. C.,Starks, L. T.(2005).Active institutional shareholders and costs of monitoring: Evidence from executive compensation.Financial Management,34(4),5-34.
3. Anderson, R. C.,Reeb, D. M.(2003).Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500.The Journal of Finance,58(3),1301-1328.
4. Antle, R.,Smith, A.(1986).An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives.Journal of Accounting Research,24(1),1-39.
5. Ashenfelter, O.(ed.),Card, D.(ed.)(1999).Handbook of Labor Economics.Amsterdam, The Netherlands:Elsevier.
6. Babenko, I.,Lemmon, M.,Tserlukevich, Y.(2011).Employee stock options and investmen.The Journal of Finance,66(3),981-1009.
7. Bacon, J.(1973).Corporate Directorship Practices: Membership and Committees of the Board.The Conference Board and American Society of Corporate Secretaries,New York, NY:
8. Beasley, M. S.(1996).An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud.The Accounting Review,71(4),443-465.
9. Berkman, H.,Coleb, R. A.,Fu, L. J.(2009).Expropriation through loan guarantees to related parties: Evidence from China.Journal of Banking & Finance,33(1),141-156.
10. Bushee, B.(1998).The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior.The Accounting Review,73(3),305-333.
11. Byrd, J. W.,Hickman, K. A.(1992).Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids.Journal of Financial Economics,32(2),195-221.
12. Chang, S. J.,Hong, J.(2000).Economic performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea: Intragroup resource sharing and internal business transactions.Academy of Management Journal,43(3),429-448.
13. Chen, D. 2008. “The monitoring and advisory functions of corporate boards: Theory and evidence." Working paper. University of Baltimore.
14. Chen, X.,Harford, J.,Li, K,(2007).Monitoring: Which institutions matter?.Journal of Financial Economics,86(2),279-305.
15. Chen, Y.,Chen, C.,Chen, W.(2009).The impact of related party transactions on the operational performance of listed companies in China.Journal of Economic Policy Reform,12(4),285-297.
16. Cheung, Y. L.,Rau, P. R.,Stouraitis, A.(2006).Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: Evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong.Journal of Financial Economics,82(2),343-386.
17. Chien, C. Y., and J. C. S. Hsu. 2010. "The role of corporate governance in related party transactions." Working paper. National Yunlin University of Science and Technology.
18. Chung, C. Y.,Wang, K.(2014).Do institutional investors monitor management? Evidence from the relationship between institutional ownership and capital structure.North American Journal of Economics and Finance,30,203-233.
19. Core, J. E.,Holthausen, R. W.,Larcker, D. F.(1999).Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance.Journal of Financial Economics,51(3),371-406.
20. DeFond, M. L.,Park, C. W.(1999).The effect of competition on CEO turnover.Journal of Accounting and Economics,27(1),35-56.
21. Diamond, D. W.,Verrecchia, R. E.(1982).Optimal managerial contracts and equilibrium security prices.The Journal of Finance,37(2),275-287.
22. Dittmar, A.,Mahrt-Smith, J.(2007).Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings.Journal of Financial Economics,83(3),599-634.
23. Dou, Y.,Sahgal, S.,Zhang, E. J.(2015).Should independent directors have term limits? The role of experience in corporate governance.Financial Management,44(3),583-621.
24. Fama, E. F.(1980).Agency problems and the theory of the firm.Journal of Political Economy,88(2),288-307.
25. Fama, E. F.,Jensen, M. C.(1983).Separation of ownership and control.The Journal of Law & Economics,26(2),301-325.
26. Ferrero-Ferrero, I.,Fernández-Izquierdo, M. Á.,Muñoz-Torres, M. J.(2012).The impact of the board of directors characteristics on corporate performance and risk- taking before and during the global financial crisis.Review of Managerial Science,6(3),207-226.
27. Gallery, G.,Gallery, N.,Supranowicz, M.(2008).Cash-based related party transactions in new economy firms.Accounting Research Journal,21(2),147-166.
28. Gibbons, R.,Murphy, K. J.(1990).Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers.Industrial & Labor Relations Review,43(3),30s-51s.
29. Gillan, S. L.(2006).Recent developments in corporate governance: An overview.Journal of Corporate Finance,12(3),381-402.
30. Gillan, S. L.,Starks, L. T.(2000).Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: The role of institutional investors.Journal of Financial Economics,57(2),275-305.
31. Gordon, E. A., E. Henry, and D. Palia. 2004. "Related party transactions: Associations with corporate governance and firm value." Working paper. Rutgers University.
32. Hartzell, J. C.,Sun, L.,Titman, S.(2014).Institutional investors as monitors of corporate diversification decisions: Evidence from real estate investment trusts.Journal of Corporate Finance,25,61-72.
33. Hölmstrom, B.(1982).Moral hazard in teams.The Bell Journal of Economics,13(2),324-340.
34. Hölmstrom, B.(1979).Moral hazard and observability.The Bell Journal of Economics,10(1),74-91.
35. Hölmstrom, B.(1992).Contracts and the Market for Executives: Comment.New York, NY:Blackwell.
36. Ibrahim, H.,Samad, F. A.(2011).Corporate governance mechanisms and performance of public-listed family-ownership in Malaysia.International Journal of Economics and Finance,3(1),105-115.
37. Jensen, M. C.(1993).The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems.The Journal of Finance,48(3),831-880.
38. Jensen, M. C.,Meckling, W. H.(1976).Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure.Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360.
39. Jian, M., and T. J. Wong. 2003. “Earnings management and tunneling through related party transactions: Evidence from Chinese corporate groups." Working paper. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.
40. Johnson, S.,Porta, R. L.,Lopez-de-Silanes, F.,Shleifer, A.(2000).Tunneling.Аmerican Ecопоmic Review,90(2),22-27.
41. Kang, J. K.,Shivdasani, A.(1995).Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan.Journal of Financial Economics,38(1),29-58.
42. Kao, L.,Chen, A.(2004).The effects of board characteristics on earnings management.Corporate Ownership & Control,1(3),96-107.
43. Kohlbeck, M. J., and B. W. Mayhew. 2004. “Related party transactions." Working paper. University of Wisconsin.
44. Lin, W. Y.,Liu, Y. A.,Keng, I.(2010).Related party transactions, firm performance and control mechanisms: Evidence from Taiwan.International Research Journal of Finance and Economics,35,82-98.
45. Lo, A. W. Y.,Wong, R. M. K.,Firth, M.(2010).Can corporate governance deter management from manipulation earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China.Journal of Corporate Finance,16(2),225-235.
46. Lys, T.,Naughton, J. P.,Wang, C.(2015).Signaling through corporate accountability reporting.Journal of Accounting and Economics,60(1),56-72.
47. Madhani, P. M.(2015).The impact of board characteristics on corporate governance and disclosure practices of firms listed in Indian stock exchange.The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance,14(4),14-46.
48. Munir, S., and R. J. Gul. 2011. “Related party transactions, family firms and firm performance: Some Malaysian evidence." Working paper. Monash University.
49. Nekhili, M.,Siala, W. A.,D. Chebbi-Nehkili(2009).Free cash flow, gouvernance et politique financière des entreprises françaises.Finance Contrôle Stratégie,12(1),5-31.
50. O'Barr, W. M,Conley, J. M.(1992).Managing relationships: The culture of institutional investing.Financial Analysts Journal,48(5),21-27.
51. Pound, J.(1988).Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight.Journal of Financial Economics,20(1-2),237-265.
52. Riyanto, Y. E.,Toolsema, L. A.(2008).Tunneling and propping: A justification for pyramidal ownership.Journal of Banking & Finance,32(10),2178-2187.
53. Ryan, H., L. Wang, and R. Wiggins. 2007. "Learning, CEO power and board-of-director monitoring: Evidence from CEO tenure." Working paper. Georgia State University.
54. Saibaba, M. D.(2013).Do board independence and CEO duality matter in firm valuation? An empirical study of Indian companies.The IUP Journal of Corporate Governance,12(1),50-67.
55. Tai, B. Y.,Liu, X.,Liu, J. M.(2007).Related-party transactions, corporate performance, and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism: Evidence from the Chinese stock market.Journal of International Business and Economics,7(2),117-131.
56. Williamson, O. E.(1988).Corporate finance and corporate governance.The Journal of Finance,43(3),567-591.
57. Yeh, Y. H.,Shu, P. G.,Su, Y. H.(2012).Related-party transactions and corporate governance: The evidence from the Taiwan stock market.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,20(5),755-776.
58. Yermack, D.(1995).Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?.Journal of Financial Economics,39(2-3),237-269.
59. 阮品嘉(2012).金融控股公司及其集團之規範與實務.台北:元照.
60. 邱垂昌,黃秀姿(2006)。自願設立獨立董事、關係人交易與公司價值關聯性之研究：代理理論與訊號發射理論之比較。Asian Journal of Management and Humanity Scicnces，1(3)，379-403。
61. 張正源(2004)。國立政治大學會計研究所。
62. 葉銀華,蘇裕惠,柯承恩,李德冠(2004)。公司治理機制對於關係人交易的影響。證券市場發展季刊，15(4)，69-106。

1. 陳昭蓉,朱全斌(2022)。企業大陸投資盈餘匯回與公司價值：公司治理評鑑及機構投資人之影響。會計評論，75，81-135。
2. 盧嘉梧,陳宗岡,郭慧如,李彥德(2021)。關係人交易特徵與實質盈餘管理之關係研究。輔仁管理評論，28(3)，37-62。
3. 薛敏正,賴思螢,葉淑玲(2023)。非主管職員工薪酬揭露規定的市場反應。證券市場發展季刊，35(3)，103-135。
4. 薛敏正,盧怡妏,葉淑玲(2022)。股權結構、公司治理與企業社會責任對員工薪酬之影響。中華會計學刊，18(2)，167-205。
5. 鄭儒鈺,楊雪蘭(2020)。內部治理與外部監督機制對公司價值之影響。會計與公司治理，15(2)，19-41。
6. (2023)。企業基金會與關係人交易之關聯性。會計與公司治理，18(2)，27-60。