题名

處分資產損益及董監事特性對盈餘管理之相關性

并列篇名

The Impact of Disposal of Assets and Board Characteristics on Earnings Management

DOI

10.6338/JDA.201612_11(6).0005

作者

葉金標(Yeh Chin-Piao);葉錦明(Jin-Ming Yeh);吳佳蓉(Jia Rong Wu)

关键词

應計項目盈餘管理 ; 處分資產利益 ; 董監事特性 ; Accruals-based Earnings Management ; Disposal of Assets ; Board Characteristics

期刊名称

Journal of Data Analysis

卷期/出版年月

11卷6期(2016 / 12 / 01)

页次

103 - 123

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

本文以Jones (1991)模型和Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005)模型,評估裁決性應計數,探討管理者將可透過裁決性應計數操縱盈餘。研究樣本取自於台灣經濟新報資料庫,取樣期間為2011~2013 年,以有進行出售處分資產損益的台灣上市公司做為研究對象,探討出售處分資產損益、應計項目盈餘管理與董監事相關特性三者間的關聯性,藉以探討出售處分資產損益是否會受到公司進行盈餘管理使得財報之應計項目而有所變動,另外再加入董監事相關特性,並同時探討兩者與盈餘管理的相關性。實證結果如下:(1)獨立董監事規模與盈餘管理有正向顯著關係。(2)負債比率與盈餘管理呈現負相關,負債比率越高,裁決性應計項目越低,表示公司盈餘管理越沒有操弄。(3)股東權益收益率與應計項目盈餘管理有負相關的顯著關係。(4)出售處分資產損益對裁決性應計項目有正向顯著關係,顯示公司當年度的財報盈餘若不理想,公司的管理階層會以出售資產的方式來增加公司的盈餘,可使得盈餘達到預期的目標。

英文摘要

The study's sample taken from the Database of Taiwan Economic Journal for the period of 2011-2003, listed companies in Taiwan have conducted on disposal of asset income obtained as the study sample. This study explore on disposal of asset income, accruals-based earnings management and board characteristics by manipulating earnings management. Disposal of assets income disposal to discuss whether the company will be making earnings accruals-based earnings management accruals related to the financial statements are therefore subject to change, then add the board characteristics to be measured, and whether the board of directors to discuss disposal of assets income, by the board of earnings management to manipulate earnings. In computation earnings partial this article by the Jones (1991) and the Kothari et al.(2005), discretionary accruals assessment to explore whether managers can arbitrary accruals to manipulate earnings, Empirical results: (1)The size of the independent directors and supervisors and earnings management has a significant positive relationship. (2) The gearing ratio and a negative correlation of earnings management, the higher the debt ratio, the less said the company manipulated earnings management. (3) Return on Equity and accruals earnings management has a significant negative correlation relationship. (4) Disposal of Assets income and Accruals-based earnings management has a significant positive relationship, the company reported fiscal year earnings is not satisfactory, the company's management will be by way of sale of assets to increase the company's earnings, can make earnings reached the desired objectives.

主题分类 基礎與應用科學 > 資訊科學
基礎與應用科學 > 統計
社會科學 > 管理學
参考文献
  1. 李春安、徐傳瑛(2010)。董事會獨立性與企業財務危機關係之研究。管理與系統,17(1),467-499。
    連結:
  2. 李馨蘋、莊宗憲(2007)。公司治理機制與公司績效之實證研究。東吳經濟商學學報,57,1-27。
    連結:
  3. 邱秀清、李慕萱、劉仲凱(2009)。董監事專業性與財務報表重編。文大商管學報,14(1),1-18。
    連結:
  4. 許永聲、陳信吉、陳琬菁(2013)。董事會特性與盈餘管理之選擇行為。會計評論,57,39-72。
    連結:
  5. 楊朝旭、吳幸蓁(2009)。資產減損之決定因素與盈餘資訊性後果:論公司治理之角色。會計評論,48,67-114。
    連結:
  6. Abarbanell, J. S. and Lehavy. R., “ Biased forecasts or biased earnings? The role of earnings management in explaining apparent optimism and inefficiency in analysts' earnings forecasts”, Working paper, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 2003.
  7. Chtourou, S. M., J. Bedard, and L. Courteau., “Corporate Governance and arnings Management”, Working paper, University of Laval Canada, 2001.
  8. Abbott, L. J.,Parker, S.,Peters, G. F.(2004).Audit committee characteristics and restatements.Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory,23(1),69-87.
  9. Agrawal, A.,Knoeber, C. R.(1996).Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,31,377-397.
  10. Alexander, C. R.,Cohen, M. A.(1999).Why Do Corporations become Criminals? Ownership, Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost.Journal of Corporate Finance,5(1),1-34.
  11. Barton, J.,Simko, P. J..The balance sheet as an earnings management constraint.The Accounting Review,77(1),1-27.
  12. Beneish, M. D.(2002).Detecting GAAP Violation: Implications for Assessing Earnings management among Firms with Financial Performance.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,16,271-309.
  13. Bhagat, S.,Black, B. S.(2002).The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance.Journal of Corporation Law,27(2),231-273.
  14. Brickley, J. A.,Coles, J. L.,Jarrell, G.(1997).Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board.Journal of Corporate Finance,189-220.
  15. Burgstahler,Dichev.(1997).Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses.Journal of Accounting and Economics,24,99-126.
  16. Dalton, D. R.,Daily, C. M.,Johnson, J. L.,Ellstarand, A. E.(1999).Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis.The Academy of Management Journal,42(6),674-686.
  17. DeAngelo, L. E.(1986).Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders.The Accounting Review,61,400-420.
  18. DeFond, M. L.,Park, C. W.(1997).Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings.Journal of Accounting and Economics,23(2),115-139.
  19. Haw, I. M.,Hu, B. B.,Hwang, L. S.,Wu, W.(2004).Ultimate ownership, income management, and legal and extra-legal institutions.Journal of Accounting Research,42(2),423-462.
  20. Healy, P. M.,Wahlen. J. M.(1999).A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting.Accounting Horizons,13(4),365-383.
  21. Hermalin, B. E.,Weisbach, M.(2003).Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined In-stitution: A Survey of the Economic Literature.Economic Policy Review,9,7-26.
  22. Hermalin, B. E.,Weisbach. M. S.(1991).The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance.Financial Management,20,101-112.
  23. Holderness, C. G.(2003).A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control.Economic Policy Review,51-63.
  24. Jensen, M. C.(1986).Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers.American Economic Review,76,323-329.
  25. Jensen, M. C.(1989).Eclipse of the public corporation.Harvard Business Review,5,61-74.
  26. Jones, J. J.(1991).Earnings management during import relief investingations.Journal of Accounting Research,29(2),193-228.
  27. Kao, L. F.,Chiou, J. R.,Chen, A.(2004).The agency problems, firm performance and monitoring mechanisms: The evidence from collateralized shares in Taiwan.Corporate Governance: An International Review,12,389-402.
  28. Klein, A.(2002).Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management.Journal of Accounting and Economics,33,375-400.
  29. Kothari, S. P.,Leone A. J.,Wasley, C. E.(2005).Performance matched disscrstionary accrual measures.Journal of Accounting and Economics,29(1),163-197.
  30. Leuz, C.,Nanda, D.,Wysocki, P. D.(2003).Earnings management and investorprotection: An international comparison.Journal of Financial Economics,69(3),505-527.
  31. Patton, A.,Baker, J. C.(1987).Why Do Not Directors Rock the Boat?.Harbard Business Review,65,10-12.
  32. Peasnell, K. V.,Pope, P. F.,Young, S.(2005).Board monitoring and earnings management: do outside directors influence abnormal accruals?.Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,32,1311-1345.
  33. Roychowdhury, S.(2006).Earnings management through real activities manipulation.Journal of Accounting and Economics,42(3),335-370.
  34. Ryan, H. E.,Wiggins III, R. A.(2004).Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring.Journal of Financial Economics,73(3),497-524.
  35. Schipper, K.(1989).Commentary on earnings management.Accounting Horizons,3(4),91-102.
  36. 方自億(2013)。博士論文(博士論文)。國立台北科技大學工商管理所。
  37. 林淑芬(1994)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。淡江大學管理科學研究所。
  38. 林陣蒼(2004)。國立台灣大學會計學研究所。
  39. 姜廷霖(2006)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。東吳大學會計學系。
  40. 陳玫縈(2007)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。靜宜大學會計學系。
  41. 陳靖誼(2004)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。國立彰化師範大學會計學系。
  42. 傅雅群(2006)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。逢甲大學會計學研究所。
  43. 黃朝信(2012)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。臺灣大學會計學研究所。
  44. 楊俊中(1998)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。國立臺灣大學會計研究所。
  45. 葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩(2002)。公司治理與評等系統。台北:商智文化。
  46. 廖益興(2010)。董事會組成、股權結構與年報資訊揭露水準。台大管理論叢,20(2),209-249。
  47. 蕭信義(2001)。國立成功大學會計學研究所。