從代理理論的新興觀點探討創業投資家的參與行為對被投資公司技術和經營績效影響之研究

From the New Perspectives of Agency Theory to Discuss the Effect of Venture Capitalists' Involvement on Their Portfolio Firms' Skills and Operating Performance

10.30003/JRM.200507.0003

劉松瑜(Sung-Yu Liu)

代理理論 ； 創業投資家 ； 創業家 ； 激勵制度 ； 監控機制 ； Agency Theory ； Venture Capitalist ； Entrepreneur ； Incentives ； Monitoring

風險管理學報

7卷2期（2005 / 07 / 01）

165 - 182

繁體中文

就代理理論而言，學者們常將監督和管理激勵計劃這兩個控制機制視為彼此之間的替代物，然而近幾年來，已開始有學者提出新興的觀點，他們主張監督和激勵彼此之間應具有互補性的關係。另外，「基本主理人－代理人的模式」雖然強調了資訊的價值，然而卻漠視技術對於公司產出所佔的重要地位；特別是就高科技產業而言，技術的提升絕對為促進企業生產力的原動力。因此，本文的代理理論模式不僅考量激勵制度和監控機制同時並存的情況，而且亦強調技術對於廠商創造價值的重要性。根據一連串的數學模式推導，本研究推論出，當創業投資家增加其參與程度，則被投資公司的技術水準和經營績效亦隨之提升；同時，創業投資家所提供給創業家的利潤分享率越高，則越能激勵創業家提升被投資公司的技術水準，進而提高被投資公司的經營績效。換言之，本研究的模式結論顯示，在創投提供給創業家激勵誘因的情況之下，創投的參與行為對於被投資公司的技術和經營績效有所貢獻，此等結果肯定激勵制度和監控機制彼此具有互補性，而這種特質有助於降低創業投資家和創業家之間資訊不對稱的程度，以及紓解二者之間的代理問題。

This paper applies agency theory which captures the essence between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, and uses von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function to analyze the effect of venture capitalists' involvement on their portfolio firms' skills and operating performance. The theoretical model not only considers the importance of new technology in modern economies, but also includes the possibility that these two control mechanisms, monitoring and incentives, might be complementary. This analysis shows venture capitalists' involvement positively influences skills and operating performance of their portfolio firms. In addition, the use of incentives for entrepreneurs also leads to higher levels of their portfolio firms' skills and operating performance. In sum, this paper supports the notion that incentives and monitoring are complementary in a venture capital setting, and this characteristic reduces information asymmetries and potential agency conflicts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.

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