题名

全域賽局在商品價格風險管理的應用

并列篇名

The Application of Global Game Theory on Risk Management of Commodity Prices

DOI

10.30003/JRM.201112.0001

作者

金志婷(Chi-Ting Chin)

关键词

全域賽局 ; 訊息事件 ; 價格僵固 ; 透明化政策 ; Global game ; Informational event ; Sticky prices ; Transparent policy

期刊名称

風險管理學報

卷期/出版年月

13卷2期(2011 / 12 / 01)

页次

105 - 132

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

在獨占性競爭的市場結構中,廠商除了可以決定本身的價格之外,市場上其他競爭廠商的訂價將會影響個別廠商所面對的需求,因此,在獨占性競爭市場下,每家廠商皆必須管理好商品價格的風險。而新興凱因斯學派認為獨占性競爭的市場結構以及廠商調價必須支付菜單成本為價格存在僵固性的主要成因。本文以獨占性競爭市場與菜單成本為例,討論價格僵固的現象,並將全域賽局的概念加入模型中,證明出:訊息事件將可能是改變廠商調價策略的一個關鍵。此外,本文明確定義出社會福利函數,分析政府的透明化措施對社會福利的影響。

英文摘要

Each firm in a monopolistically competitive industry is able to determine the price of its product and the amount of its product it can sell depends on the prices offered by other firms in the industry. Thus, all of producers in a monopolistically competitive industry have to pay attention to risk management of commodity prices. Some new Keynesian economists suggest that price fluctuations resulted from monopolistic competition and menu costs. This paper considers monopolistic competition and menu costs to discuss sticky prices. We introduce the global game into the self-fulfilling price adjustment model and show that an informational event would be a trigger for a price adjustment. Furthermore, we define the social welfare to obtain the range of the economic state for the transparency policy adopted by a government.

主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
社會科學 > 管理學
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