题名

美國分期分級董事會與公司創新之間的探討

并列篇名

The Effect of Staggered Boards on Corporate Innovation

DOI

10.6504/JMBR.201903_36(1).0001

作者

陳一如(I-Ju Chen)；王衍智(Yanzhi Wang)；吳政祐(Cheng-You Wu)

关键词

分期分級董事會 ； 公司創新 ； 公司治理 ； staggered boards ； corporate innovation ； corporate governance

期刊名称

管理學報

卷期/出版年月

36卷1期（2019 / 03 / 01）

页次

1 - 28

内容语文

繁體中文;英文
中文摘要

本研究旨在探討美國分期分級董事會制度與公司創新之間的關聯性。作者利用1995年至2012年美國S&P1500上市公司董事會制度的資料，並從美國經濟研究所（NBER）資料庫及美國專利及商標局（USPTO）中獲取專利數量和專利被引用次數作為公司創新的代理變數，實證探討此研究議題。實證結果發現，美國分期分級董事會制度與公司創新之間呈現正相關，隱含分期分級董事會制度能有效提升公司創新產出。且當公司規模較小、投入較多的研發活動、公司本身成長性較高或是該公司所屬市場的競爭程度越高時，公司使用分期分級董事會制度，可以進一步提升其創新能力；除此之外，本研究也發現，當公司的治理程度較差時，維持使用分期分級董事會制度對公司的創新能力有顯著負面的影響效果。
英文摘要

This study aims to investigate the linkage between staggered boards and corporate innovation. Corporate innovation is high risk, unpredictable, long-term, and idiosyncratic (Holmstrom, 1989). Its riskiness may be a disincentive for managers planning investment in innovation. (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Smith & Stulz, 1985; Hirshleifer & Thakor, 1992; Narayanan, 1985; Stein, 1989; Bebchuk & Stole, 1993). In our study, we expect that a staggered board helps firms to implement a stable, long-term investment policy, and therefore, foster innovation. We use the sample of S&P 1500 firms listed in the U.S. in the 1995 - 2012 period and collect the patent and citation data from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent citation database to examine our empirical tests. The empirical evidence shows that staggered boards help companies foster their innovation output. Firms with staggered boards generally have higher level of innovation; this is especially the case in firms with a smaller size, higher growth opportunities, and those either in more competitive industries or having higher research and development expenses. Moreover, our results also show that staggered board hampers a firm's innovation output when it has poor governance structure.
主题分类 社會科學 > 管理學
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