题名

Does Governance Travel Across Industries? A Mutual Fund Episode

并列篇名

公司治理是否可以橫跨不同產業?以共同基金為例

DOI

10.6504/JMBR.202006_37(2).0003

作者

張晏誠(Yen-Cheng Chang);曾俊凱(Kevin Tseng);顏嘉儀(Chia-Yi Yen)

关键词

knowledge transmission ; return gap ; corporate governance ; regression discontinuity ; 知識傳播 ; 報酬差 ; 公司治理 ; 回歸不連續

期刊名称

管理學報

卷期/出版年月

37卷2期(2020 / 06 / 01)

页次

169 - 186

内容语文

英文

中文摘要

We examine whether better-managed mutual funds are at the same time good corporate monitors by exploiting small changes in market capitalizations of firms around the Russell 1000 and 2000 index cutoff. Tracking error concerns force active mutual funds to buy addition stocks that move into the Russell 2000 index. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that increases in ownership by better-managed mutual funds leads to better overall governance with more independent directors, fewer anti-takeover measures, and more equal voting rights. Firms' operating performance also improve. Our results provide evidence that managerial knowledge is transmittable across industries.

英文摘要

本文利用Russell 1000及Russell 2000指數交界的小幅市值變動研究是否管理較佳之共同基金亦是較好的公司監理者。上市公司若由Russell 1000被加入Russell 2000,將會迫使主動式的共同基金因追蹤誤差之考量而買入其股票。我們使用迴歸不連續之方法,發現若擁有較佳管理績效之共同基金持有率上升,則被持有公司之公司治理指標也會改善,包括較多之獨立董事、較少之反收購措施、較平等之股東投票權,同時公司之營運績效也會上升。本文之結果提供了管理知識可以跨越產業之證據。

主题分类 社會科學 > 管理學
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