設置提名委員會與財務績效關聯性之研究

The Study on the Association of Nominating Committee On Firm’s Financial Performance

10.6846/TKU.2019.00597

陳祈儒

提名委員會 ； 財務績效 ； 公司治理 ； 家族企業 ； Nominating Committee ； Financial Performance ； Corporate Governance ； Family Corporation

淡江大學會計學系碩士在職專班學位論文

2019年

碩士

徐志順

繁體中文

近幾年台灣證券市場興起接班議題，並可發現設置提名委員會的上市櫃公司有增加之趨勢，提名委員會除了有助於公司治理評鑑積分，其於運作上之應有實質助益。本研究以提名委員會設置與否、設置前後為自變數，股東權益報酬率及托賓比率為財務績效之衡量指標，來探討台灣上市櫃公司設置提名委員會對財務績效的關聯性。 本研究樣本來源為2003年至2019年第一季止的期間內設置有提名委員會之上市櫃公司，採行配對樣本法篩選出未設置提名委員會之企業做作為配對樣本，自台灣經濟新報(TEJ)蒐集相關研究數據，進行多元迴歸分析。實證結果發現，設置提名委員會的企業與財務績效有顯著正相關；企業設置提名委員會後與財務績效呈顯著負相關；家族企業設置提名委員會與財務績效呈顯著正相關。另外做進一步分析的結論，設置提名委員會之企業其董事會獨立性對財務績效呈顯著正相關；企業設置提名委員會後其董事會的獨立性對財務績效呈顯著正相關、家族企業設置提名委員會後的董事會獨立性對財務績效呈顯著正相關。 本論文結果於實務上可做為主管機關推動提名委員會的參考，對上市櫃公司而言，設置提名委員會具有正面的實質意義。

Recently, the Taiwan securities market has raised the issue of business succession, and thus setting up the Nomination Committees has become one of the mainstream when applied to Corporate Governance. By setting up the Nomination Committee, the firm would not only win a higher grade in Corporate Governance evaluation, but, which is more important, to strengthen the business management and financial performance. This study's independent variables are whether to set up Nomination Committee, and the circumstances before and after setting up such Committee. The Return on Equity (ROE) ratio and the Tobin ratio are applied to measure the financial performance. By utilizing such methodology, we are able to explore how the Nomination Committee affects the firm’s financial performance. The sample source of this study was the listed firms which have equipped the Nomination Committee during the period from 2003 to the Q1, 2019. On the other hand, we utilize the matched-sample to screen out firms that have not set up a Nomination Committee as a contrast. All the research data is collected from TEJ and applied to Multiple regression analysis. The results of whether setting up a Nominating Committee bring out a significant positive correlation to firm's financial performance; bring out a significant negative correlation to firm's financial performance after setting up the Committee; however, if the firm refers to a family business, it will bring out a significant positive correlation to its financial performance if setting up the mentioned Committee. Furthermore, by setting up the Committee, the board independence is significantly positively correlated to firm's financial performance in all ways. The results of this thesis are able to be adopted as a reference for the Competent Authority to promote the advantages of setting up a Nominating Committee. For firms, setting up a nomination committee has positive substantive significance.

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