英文摘要
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A series of financial reporting frauds have broken out in recent years, like Enron and Worldcom found overseas and Procomp informatics, Welltend Technology and Rebar Group in Taiwan. In the U.S., Sarbanes-Oxley is enacted to strengthen auditor independence and weaken the reliance between auditor and auditee, thereby maintaining the essence of complete independence and decreasing the occurrence of fraud. But in Taiwan, the related laws still are still short of such enforced regulation to improve auditor independence. This paper therefore focuses on the revolving-door phenomenon in our accounting practice to explore its influence on the audit quality.
This study observes listed companies from 1999 to 2009 to investigate that while revolving-door firms are still during the quasi-revolving-door period, whether the audit quality is lower than those non-revolving door firms. This study also explores the audit quality variance of revolving-door firms from quasi-revolving-door period to revolving-door transferring year. In this paper, the Modified Jones Model is used to estimate the discretionary accruals and performance control are applied to measure the audit quality. Samples are paired 1- to- 2 to establish the revolving-door experimental group and the non-revolving-door controlled group. Ordinary least squares (OLS) are used for our empirical evidence.
The empirical results shows that the revolving-door companies in the Quasi-revolving period are with discretionary accruals significantly higher than those non-revolving-door companies. That is to say, the revolving-door phenomenon impairs the auditor's independence even early in the quasi-revolving-door period, namely in the pre-revolving-door period. That makes the audit quality of revolving door companies to be lower than the other companies.
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