審計委員會成員任期與盈餘管理之關聯性

The Association between Independent Audit Committee members’ Board Tenure and Earnings Management

10.6840/cycu201900202

周榮聖

審計委員會 ； 任期 ； 盈餘管理 ； Audit Committee ； Tenure ； Earnings Management

中原大學會計學系學位論文

2019年

碩士

高儷華

繁體中文

本研究檢視2006年至2017年我國已設置審計委員會之上市(櫃)公司其審計委員會成員之任期與盈餘管理與兩者間之關聯。 盈餘管理之衡量本研究分為裁決性應計數絕對值（ABSDA），以及帶有方向性之裁決性應計數正值（DA+）和裁決性應計數負值（DA-）兩群子樣本進行評估。審計委員會成員之任期以三種方式衡量 - 平均任期（AVGTENURE）、最長任期（MAXTENURE），以及任期間距(最長任期與平均任期之間的差額)（MAXAVG）。 實證結果顯示，AVGTENURE，MAXTENURE和MAXAVG均與DA-呈顯著正相關，而與ABSDA和DA+呈顯著負相關（除MAXAVG和DA+外）。以上實證結果說明，當審計委員會成員之任期愈長，因經驗之累計以及對產業更加熟悉之原因，更能夠使其深入瞭解企業營運之過程，並且有效發揮審計委員會監督之功能，抑制企業盈餘管理之行為。

This study examines the relationship between earnings management and the independent audit committee members’ board tenure for Taiwan listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies with audit committee from the year of 2006 to the year of 2017. The earning management is assessed with the discretion accruals absolute value (ABSDA), the discretion accruals positive value (DA+), and the discretion accruals negative value (DA-). The independent audit committee members’ board tenure is measured by three ways－average board tenure (AVGTENURE), the longest board tenure (MAXTENURE), and the difference between average board tenure and the longest board tenure (MAXAVG). The empirical results indicate that AVGTENURE, MAXTENURE, and MAXAVG are all significantly positively related to DA- , but negatively related to ABSDA and DA+; except for MAXAVG and DA+. In other words, the longer the independent audit committee members stay in the board, the more industrial expertise they get, and easier for them to understand the process of business operations. Therefore, the audit committee members can play the supervision role to mitigate the extent of earnings management behavior.

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