薪酬委員會之勤奮程度對高階經理人薪酬之影響

The Effect of Compensation Committee’s Diligence on Top Management’s compensation

10.6840/cycu201700338

林語柔

薪酬委員會開會次數 ； 薪酬委員會開會出席率 ； 高階經理人薪酬 ； Compensation Committee’s Number of Meetings ； Compensation Committee’s Attendance Rate ； Top Management’s compensation

中原大學會計學系學位論文

2017年

碩士

李德冠

繁體中文

本研究主要以2015 年上市公司為研究對象，探討薪酬委員會之勤奮程度與高階經理人薪酬之影響，並主要關注於高階經理人與董事兼任經理人之薪酬，其中勤奮程度分別為薪酬委員會之開會次數與開會出席率作為探討。研究結果指出薪酬委員會開會次數的增加未能降低高階經理人以及董事兼任經理人之薪酬，反而會增加其薪酬。這可能表示薪酬委員會每次開會時未能針對經理人薪酬達成一致的意見，所以需多次開會來達成共識，但即使開會次數增加，依然未能達成共識制定出合理之薪酬，故最後未能有效發揮作用。在薪酬委員會開會出席率方面，出席率的提升能降低高階經理人以及董事兼任經理人之薪酬。

This study focuses on the listed companies in 2015 as the object of study, to explore the effect of compensation committee’s diligence on top management’s compensation, and mainly concerned about the top management and the CEO duality’s compensation, and compensation committee’s diligence including the number of meetings and attendance rates of meetings. The results indicate that the increase in the number of meetings of the compensation Committee has failed to reduce the compensation of top management and the CEO duality. The above results may arise from the member of compensation committee failing to reach a consensus on the top manager's compensation at the earlier meetings. Hence, it is necessary to get more meetings to reach a consensus, but even if the number of meetings increased failed to reach a consensus to develop a reasonable salary, so final failed to do their duties. As regards the attendance rate of the compensation committee, the increase in attendance rate can reduce the compensation of s top management and the CEO duality.

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