研發成果產權之最適分配

The Analysis on the Optimal Allocation of R&D Property Rights

10.30087/APEMR.200409.0001

陳建華；劉楚俊

研發契約 ； 產權 ； 剩餘收益權 ； R&D Contract ； Property Rights ； Residual Rights

亞太經濟管理評論

8卷1期（2004 / 09 / 01）

1 - 12

繁體中文

本文旨在不完全契約架構下，探討研發產權最適分配之問題。本文認為，當雙方的事前投資具有互補性時，由研發單位或廠商擁有全部研發產出產權並非有效率的分配方式。再者，研發產權的最適分配需視雙方投資的相對重要性而定。當研發單位的事前投資在生產過程中相對重要時，研發單位應擁有較多的研發成果產權，相反地，廠商擁有的產權便相對較低。此外，本文所分析之模型，亦可供科技管理領域未來實證研究之參考。

The paper analyzes the optimal allocation of the R&D property right in an incomplete contract framework. This paper argues that the integrated cases are inefficient when both investments are complementary. Furthermore, the optimal allocation of the R&D property right only depends on the relative important of investment in production process. When research unit's investment is important relative to the firm's, the research unit should own large share of R&D property rights, whereas firm obtain small share of R&D property rights. Our analysis also provides an empirical model to future studies especially in the management of technology.

1. Aghion, P.,J. Tirole(1994).The Management of Innovation.Quarterly Journal of Economics,109,1185-1209.
2. Alchian, A.,H. Demsetz(1972).Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.American Economic Review,62,777-795.
3. Anbarci, N.,Lemke, R.,S. Roy(2002).Inter-firm Complementarities in R&D: A Re-examination of the Relative Performance of Joint Ventures.International journal of Industrial Organization,20,191-213.
4. Barzel. Y.(1989).Economic Analysis of Property Rights.Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press.
5. Demsetz, H.(1988).Ownership, Control, and the Firm: The Organization of Economic Activity.Cambridge, Mass:Basil Blackwell.
6. Eswaran, M.,A. Kotwal(1984).The Moral Hazard of Budget-breaking.Rand Journal of Economics,15,578-581.
7. Grossman, S.,O. Hart(1986).The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.Journal of Political Economy,94,691-719.
8. Hart, O. and J. Moore(1990).Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm.Journal of Political Economy,98,1119-1158.
9. Holmstrom, B.(1982).Moral Hazard in Teams.Bell Journal of Economics,13,324-340.
10. Holmstrom, B.,J. Tirole,Schmalensee, R.,R. Willig (ed.)(1996).Handbook of Industrial Organization.New York, NY:North-Holland.
11. Inkpen, A.C.(1998).Learning, Knowledge Acquisition, and Strategic Alliances.European Management Journal,16,223-229.
12. Kamien, M.,Muller, E.,I. Zang(1992).Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartel.American Economic Review,82,1293-1306.
13. Klein, B.,Crawford, R.,A. Alchian(1978).Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process.Journal of Law and Economics,21,297-326.
14. Maskin, E,J. Tirole(1999).Two Remarks on the Property Rights Literature.Review of Economic Studies,66,139-149.
15. Perry, M.,Schmalensee, R.,R. Willig (ed.)(1996).Handbook of Industrial Organization.New York, NY:North-Holland.
16. Tirole, J.(1999).Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand.Econometrica,67,741-781.
17. Tirole, J.(1986).Procurement and Renegotiation.Journal of Political Economy,94,235-259.
18. Williamson, O.(1979).Transaction-cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations.Journal of Law and Economics,22,233-261.
19. Williamson, O.(1985).The Economics Institutions of Capitalism.New York, NY:Free Press.
20. Williamson, O.(1975).Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.New York, NY:Free Press.
21. 方世杰、林麗娟、鄭仲興(2000)。合作研發之組織學習與績效的研究－以參與工研院科技專案之廠商為例。科技管理學刊，5(3)，105-133。
22. 張維迎(1995)。企業的企業家－契約理論。上海:人民出版社。
23. 楊小凱(1998)。經濟學原理。北京:中國社會科學出版社。