题名 |
鄰避情結之衝突協商 |
并列篇名 |
Conflict Resolution of "Not In My Backyard Syndrome" |
DOI |
10.30087/APEMR.200409.0005 |
作者 |
蔡宗秀 |
关键词 |
鄰避情結 ; 公害糾紛 ; 奈許協商模型 ; 治理機制 ; NIMBY Syndrome ; Nuisance Disputes ; Nash Bargaining Solution Model ; Institutional Design |
期刊名称 |
亞太經濟管理評論 |
卷期/出版年月 |
8卷1期(2004 / 09 / 01) |
页次 |
67 - 84 |
内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
中文摘要 |
「鄰避情結」泛指社區民眾雖然心中認同鄰避性設施建立的必要性,卻反對這些設施設置在自己家後院的情緒反應。如何設計一套完備的制度設計有效的化解鄰避情結,一直是各領域學者努力的目標。本文從環境經濟學的角度探討經濟學者如何看待鄰避情結,以及當前的談判協商機制如何有效的化解鄰避情結衝突。 針對鄰避情結的協商化解機制,本文從一個簡單的兩人合作賽局中推導出可能影響環境衝突解決的因子,並與高雄縣仁武焚化廠設廠糾紛做對照,進而提出可能解決環境衝突的制度設計。本文認為除了落實污染者付費的原則,讓社會福利的享用者也能承擔鄰避設施的風險之外,鄰避情結的化解機制尚需涵蓋環境風險資訊蒐集的對稱性、法令規範與財產權之明確定義,以及權力結構的調和。從此角度思索,當前的公害糾紛處理法似應適度的修法以有效發揮其化解衝突的功能。 |
英文摘要 |
The ”not in my backyard syndrome” (NIMBY) is everywhere in the world. The purpose of this paper is to provide an environmental economics analysis to examine what are the possible institutional designs to resolve NIMBY conflicts. By building a simply Bash bargaining solution model, this paper examines the factors that might cause NIMBY conflicts in theory. A NIMBY conflict happened in Kaohsiung Province is further examined to foster the theoretical findings. Based on the case study, this paper suggests an appropriate institutional design should implement the ”polluter-pay principle.” Moreover, to be able to resolve conflicts effectively, an appropriate institution design should cover an information gathering mechanism regarding to environmental risks, a clear definition of contract law and tort liability, and a mechanism to reconcile power structures within the interest groups. |
主题分类 |
社會科學 >
經濟學 |
参考文献 |
|
被引用次数 |
|