Value-Based Pricing and Fee Structure in Franchising Business

價值定價法與特許加盟事業的費用結構

曲祉寧(Chu, Chih-Ning)

東海管理評論

17卷1期（2015 / 07 / 01）

163 - 187

英文

This paper is a primitive research of the franchising fee structures in Taiwan, based on limited sample number, around 30 franchising contract collected from our field study. According to the empirical data of the tea beverage industry in Taiwan, we have the following finding. When both franchise fees and royalties are integrated and seen as the pricing strategy based on the value created by different franchisors' services for franchisees, the high-fidelity franchisors use both fees together as a positioning strategy to differentiate themselves from low-fidelity franchisors. That is, the high-fidelity franchisors will charge either high franchise fees with high royalties, or low franchise fees with low royalties. However, for low-fidelity franchisors, there is no significant relationship between the franchise fees and royalties. That is, we found that both franchise fees and royalties can be used as franchisors' positioning strategy to differentiate their dedication to franchisees. This finding is different from the implication of the agency theory, which suggests that the franchise fee and royalty are negatively correlated and the franchise fees are used to exploit the franchisees' rents.

這篇論文是討論加盟連鎖費用結構的一篇的探索性文章。根據我們針對台灣的茶飲料市場的田野調查中所獲得的30份加盟連鎖契約資料，我們有如下的發現。首先，當加盟主把加盟金與權利金當成傳遞其服務價值的定價策略時，盡責的加盟總部，如果其所提的經營知識(know-how)品質較高，不僅每個月會向加盟主收取比較高的權利金之外，也會在簽訂加盟契約時向加盟主收取比較高的加盟金；相對地，當盡責的加盟總部自知所提供的經營知識價值較低時，其向加盟主收取的加盟金與權利金都會較低。也就時說，根據價值定價法，盡責的加盟主在加盟金與權利金的收取上，應該會具有正向的顯著關係，而其費用的水平高、低就取決於其經營知識的價值。而對不盡責的加盟總部來說，特別是他們的經營知識價值並不明確時，他們有強烈動機想模糊權利金與加盟金的關係，加盟金與權利金之間，就很難說有明確的正向或負向關係。而本文關於加盟金與權利金具有正向關係的發現，與代理理論認為加盟金與權利金應該是負相關的結論不盡相同。

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