獨立董事具有監督效果或僅是花瓶？

Would Independent Directors Serve with Monitoring Function or Just a Decorating Figure?

李伶珠(Ling-Chu Lee)；劉俊儒(Chun-Ju Liu)；劉毅馨(Yi-Hsin Liu)

監督 ； 董事會獨立性 ； 獨立董事 ； Monitoring ； Board independence ； Independent director

東海管理評論

18卷1期（2016 / 07 / 01）

219 - 267

繁體中文

獨立董事的設置是否有助於提升監督成效，過去的研究並無定論。本文利用非金融業上市櫃公司資料，探討獨立董事的監督成效。過去文獻對於監督成效之衡量僅就單一層面，本文則依據董事會監督不當負面後果之嚴重性，由重而輕，依序為財務危機、財務報表重編、與資訊透明度等三類來衡量監督成效。實證結果有二，第一，對於自願性樣本而言，董事會獨立性可提高監督成效，包括降低財務危機發生的機率、降低財務報表重編發生的機率、與改善資訊透明度。第二，對於強制性樣本而言，董事會獨立性對資訊透明度並無顯著影響，獨立董事只不過是裝飾性的花瓶，不具監督效果；相對而言，獨立董事在防止財務危機或財務報表重編事件就會發揮其監督功能。研究意涵為，當監督不當的負面後果嚴重程度越高時，獨立董事的監督效果越明顯。

Inconsistent conclusions have been drawn from prior studies on whether independent directors can improve the monitoring effect. Excluding the financial industries, this study utilizes data from firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and Over-the-Counter Securities Exchange (OTC) to examine the impacts of board independence on the monitoring effect. The previous literature on assessing this effect relied solely on a single aspect, whereas this study measures the monitoring effect based on the seriousness of the negative consequences due to inappropriate board monitoring. These negative consequences are ranked by their seriousness, from top to bottom, as: financial crisis, restatement of financial statement, and information transparency. The empirical results indicate that firstly, for the samples voluntarily installed, board independence truly enhances the monitoring effect, significantly reduces the occurrence probability of financial crisis and restatement of financial statement, and also improves information transparency. Secondly, for the samples mandatorily installed, independent directors only serve as a decorating figure and exhibit no monitoring effect on information transparency. In contrast, independent directors would serve supervising functions in order to prevent a financial crisis and restatement of financial statement. The implication for our study is that independent directors play their monitoring roles better if more serious consequences are drawn due to inappropriate monitoring.

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