認真對待大法官解釋：論大法官解釋之落實

Taking Constitutional Court Decisions Seriously: The Implementation of J.Y. Interpretations

10.6199/NTULJ.202012_49(4).0001

林建志(Chien-Chih Lin)

臺灣憲法法院 ； 大法官解釋之執行 ； 單純違憲宣告 ； 司法造法 ； 定期失效 ； Taiwan Constitutional Court ； implementation of Judicial Yuan Interpretations ； suspension order with no deadline ； judicial lawmaking ； suspension order with deadline

臺大法學論叢

49卷4期（2020 / 12 / 01）

1777 - 1843

繁體中文

在臺灣，憲法學者多半聚焦於大法官解釋的內容本身，而忽略了解釋做成後的執行情形。然而，解釋執行的重要性實際上不亞於解釋本身的內容為何，因為如果一個解釋不會被政治部門所執行，那麼不論該解釋內容多麼保障人權、維護憲政秩序，都只是鏡花水月，這對於憲法法院的權威與司法獨立是一大損害，長久下來更可能危及法治國原則。在調查解嚴後所公布的大法官解釋執行狀況之後，本文發現：首先，解釋的「拘束力」，也就是那些寫在解釋文的大法官諭知，既非解釋會被執行的必要條件，也非充分條件。第二，單純違憲宣告的解釋方式可能使解釋較不易被執行。第三，解釋未被執行，未必可以全然歸責於政治部門，在某些特殊情況下，憲法法院可能必須負擔一部分的責任。這個發現使我們得以重新思考司法造法的正當性與必要性，以及憲法訴訟作為不同層次的社會變遷的可能性。

In Taiwan, most constitutional scholars pay scant attention to the compliance of Judicial Yuan Interpretations. Nonetheless, the compliance of constitutional court decisions is no less important than the ruling itself. If a court decision will not be implemented, the protection of fundamental rights and separation of powers are like chasing the will-o'-the-wisp. This is a devastating blow to the authority and independence of the constitutional court. In the long run, it may undermine the rule of law and constitutionalism. To fill this academia lacuna, this paper investigates the compliance of every constitutional court decision that the Court made after democratization. Although most Judicial Yuan Interpretations have been faithfully implemented by the authorities concerned, this paper argues that: 1) the binding force, that is, when a mandate is written in the ruling rather than the reasoning, is neither sufficient nor necessary to force the political branches to implement judicial decisions; 2) political branches are less likely to implement decisions with suspension order with no deadline or with advisory deadline; 3) sometimes the noncompliance of judicial decisions should be attributed to the Constitutional Court itself, at least in part, instead of the political branches. These findings entail two normative implications. First, judicial lawmaking, albeit ostensibly undemocratic, is necessary in some scenarios when the political branches deliberately choose to ignore judicial decisions. That is, judges are, in a sense, forced to legislate. Second, the findings may provide another perspective for public interest lawyers and social groups to rethink whether the Constitutional Court can bring about different levels of social change. On the one hand, it seems clear that judicial decisions do have a direct effect on legal change because most of them have been enforced. On the other hand, whether judicial decisions have indirect effect seems to be less certain.

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