產品異質、生產技術差異與垂直相關生產下的貿易政策

The Optimal Export Policy with Vertical Related Product, Asymmetric Production Technology, and Heterogeneous Consumption

10.7074/YDAJB.201106.0127

許竹筌(Chu-Chuan Hsu)；黃金樹(Chin-Shu Huang)

垂直相關生產 ； 異質財 ； 貿易政策 ； JEL分類代號：F12，F13 ； vertical related product ； heterogeneous consumption goods ； trade policy JEL Classification: F12, F13

育達科大學報

27期（2011 / 06 / 01）

125 - 146

繁體中文

本文係在最終財具異質性與及其生產技術存在差異的情況下，探討最終財出口貿易政策與中間財進口政策的對等性，以及最適貿易政策的決定等議題。本文獲致以下幾點結論：1.中間財單一定價下，當外國廠商生產技術高於本國廠商或產品差異程度較大時，本國應採取對最終財出口課稅或中間財的進口課稅政策；當外國廠商生產技術低於本國廠商或產品差異程度較小時，本國應採取對最終財的出口補貼或中間財的進口補貼政策。2.最終財出口貿易政策與中間財進口貿易政策兩者，可完全互相替代或具有對等性。

We follow the Bernhofen (1997) and Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) framework to establish a model of an industry with vertical related product, foreign monopolistic intermediate inputs and linear heterogeneous final goods. This paper is to discuss the export of final goods and import of intermediate goods trade policy of equivalence, the optimal trade policy decisions and other issues leads to the following conclusions: 1. Uniform pricing of intermediate goods, when the production technology of foreign firms than domestic firms or the degree of consumption differentiation is large enough, their final products should be adopted export tax or import of intermediate goods taxation; when foreign firms production technology than domestic firms or the degree of consumption differentiation is small enough, the country should adopt final goods export subsidies or subsidized imports of intermediate goods. 2. The final goods export and the intermediate goods import trade policy, both, can completely replace each other or with policy equivalence.

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