不景氣時期之高階經理人薪酬結構與公司未來績效

Executive Compensation Structure and Firm's Future Performance in Depression Era

高惠松(Hui-Sung Kao)；詹照潔(Chao-Chieh Chan)

經濟不景氣 ； 高階經理人薪酬 ； 公司績效 ； 企業生命週期 ； Economic depression ； Executive compensation ； Firm performance ； Corporate life cycle

東吳經濟商學學報

80期（2013 / 03 / 01）

81 - 117

繁體中文

本文主要研究目的是分析公司處於不景氣時期，如何透過薪酬設計制度提昇公司未來績效。再者，以企業生命週期觀點，當公司面臨不同生命週期如何透過薪酬設計制度提昇公司未來績效。本研究以國內上市櫃公司為主要研究對象，並以2007年至2008年之全球金融危機時期來衡量不景氣時期，探討此時期企業應如何規劃高階經理人薪酬制度，以激勵高階經理人努力，促使公司可較快回復以往之經營績效水準。本研究採多元迴歸分析，首先，高階經理人整體總薪酬與公司未來績效呈現顯著正向關係。再者，本研究發現在不景氣時期與景氣時期恰好相反，在不景氣時期，公司應發放高階經理人確定薪酬（薪資、獎金及特支費以及現金股利），不建議發放不確定薪酬（股票股利以及員工認股權），如此較具有激勵的誘因，對公司未來績效較好。除此之外，當企業處於不同的生命週期階段，在不景氣時期時，成長期階段公司較重視現金股利之發放，對公司未來績效較佳；另外，當企業進入成熟期階段，較不建議發放股票股利，可有利於公司未來績效；最後，基於提昇公司未來績效，當企業進入衰退期階段，則較不建議發放現金股利。本研究結果可作為公司薪酬委員會制定高階經理人薪酬之依據，並作為其他利害關係人進行決策判斷的參考。

The purpose of this paper discussed how to use compensation mechanism enhance firm's future performance in depression era. According to corporate life cycle perspective, demonstrate how to design compensation mechanism enhance firm's future performance in different life cycle. This study used listed and OTC companies of Taiwan as sample. Using global financial crisis in 2007-2008 years measured the economic depression. We demonstrate how to design executive compensation to induce senior managers put the efforts to increase firm's future performance. This study used multiple regression models to estimate and discover different types of compensation of senior managers will cause different impacts on firm's future performance in the economic depression. First, there is positive significantly relationship between the total compensation of senior managers and the firm's future performance. Furthermore, we found the opposite result in the depression era and the boom era. In depression era, the company should pay confirm compensation (salary, bonuses and special expenses, and cash dividends) for senior managers, and do not give them uncertain compensation (stock dividends and employee stock options). This compensation design is more incentives and could increase firm's future performance. Beside, when firm in different corporate life cycle should have different compensation design. In grow period, firm should pay more cash dividend to increase firm's future performance. In addition, when the company get into maturity period must decrease pay stock di vidend to promote firm's future performance. Finally, company should not pay cash dividend to senior managers in decline period. The findings of this study could provide the company's compensation committee to establish the executive compensation for a basis. The stakeholders also could use this result to do decision-making by reference.

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