蒯因論真

Quine on Truth

10.7065/MRPC.200808.0111

侯維之(Richard W. T. Hou)

蒯因 ； 真 ； 縮簡主義 ； 消解引號真理理論 ； 內在真 ； 事實性 ； Quine ； true/truth ； deflationism ； the disquotational theory of truth ； immanent truth ； factuality

哲學與文化

35卷8期（2008 / 08 / 01）

111 - 141

繁體中文

在蒯因的哲學立場中，最不清楚的應該是他對「真」的看法。或許他最關注的是經驗與理論之間的關係，是經驗內容、證據、與袤廣科學理論間的關聯。「真」這個概念在他的哲學理論中，似乎擺盪於不同的立場之間。譬如說，蒯因對經驗上相等理論何者為真的家國式立場(sectarian position)，戴維森認為正是支持融貫真理理論的結果。但另一方面，蒯因似乎又認為塔斯基的真理語架，對真理符應理論提供了合理的說明。當然，蒯因同時又是縮簡主義真理理論的早期倡導者之一，明確說過「真就是引號消除(disquotation)」。 本文將以蒯因本身的理論為基礎，探討蒯因針對消解引號「真」、融貫「真」、符應「真」、或內在「真」(immanent truth)的諸般主張。我想要論證的是，我們必須認真看待蒯因的消解引號「真」理論，如此才能對他上述關於「真」的諸般言論，提出一致的解釋。我認為，蒯因並未在消解引號「真」之外，又主張任何知識論上或存有學上的「真」。所有他關於「真」的考慮，皆可以、也應該以消解引號「真」理論作為詮釋的出發點。「真」這個字在許多脈絡中的出現，應該被視為集合性語詞，只是縮寫或表達具備共同特性的相關「真」語句而已。

Among Quine's philosophy, his account on truth is probably the mistiest part. Perhaps what concerns him most is the relation between experience and scientific theories, is the relation between empirical content, evidence, and scientific theories in the broad sense. His attitude toward the conception of truth seems to vacillate between different theories, due to his various philosophical positions. For instance, regarding Quine's sectarian position of which empirically equivalent theories should be taken as true, Davidson thinks that it is the consequence of holding the coherence theory of truth. On the other hand, Quine appears to consider Tarski's T schema as giving the correspondence theory of truth a sensible account. Moreover, Quine is one of the trail-blazers of the deflationary theory of truth, stating specifically ”Truth is disquotation”. This paper is based on Quine's own theory, discussing his multiple claims regarding disquotational truth, coherent truth, correspondence truth, or immanent truth. What I would like to argue is that, in order to consistently explain his various claims concerning truth, we have to take Quine's disquotational theory of truth seriously. I think that, except his disquotational account, Quine does not make any claim of epistemological truth or ontological truth. All of his consideration regarding truth can be and should be explained in terms of his disquotational theory of truth. The appearance of the word 'true'/'truth' in many contexts should be seen as playing a collective term, as abbreviating or expressing true sentences with the same feature.

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