公私混合執法理論之建構：從美國證券集團訴訟改革看台灣投保中心團體訴訟

趙冠瑋

證券詐欺 ； 公權力執法 ； 私人訴訟 ； 吹哨者 ； 私人檢察官 ； 私人檢察官公益訴訟 ； securities fraud ； public enforcement ； private enforcement ； whistleblower ； private attorney general ； qui tam litigation

東海大學法學研究

60期（2020 / 10 / 01）

43 - 86

繁體中文

依照傳統公法及私法區別理論，對於侵害公共利益之不法行為係由公權力機關為執法主體（公權力執法），另外，受同一不法行為侵害之私人則可提起訴訟請求損害賠償（私人訴訟），然而此兩種執法模式在許多執法活動並非各自運作而是互相補充混合，尤其是在證券詐欺執法領域，如美國活躍激進的證券詐欺集團訴訟不僅補充甚至干預聯邦證券管理委員會（SEC）的公權力執法，因此博得「私人檢察官（private attorney general）」之封號。反之，SEC亦透過公權力執法所得之罰金及不法所得用以補償投資人損害。然令人遺憾地是，公私部門混合執法的多樣化在台灣執法體系中並未受到重視及運用。為此，本文主張公私混合執法模型係以光譜化的形式呈現，並提出若以公權力在私人訴訟干涉的強度由強到弱區分將有三種模式：（1）混合獨占執法模式（2）混合監督執法模式及（3）混合補償執法模式。本文並以公私部門協力成立之證券投資人及期貨交易人保護中心（投保中心）為例，適用上開三種模式以改善證券詐欺執法功能。關於「混合獨占執法模式」，本文建議投保中心應依照公私執法機關之優勢及趨勢分配執法活動，並將資源密集型的證券訴訟委外私部門執法；關於「混合監督執法模式」，投保中心可作為公私部門雙向監督之軸心，一方面作為受理私部門吹哨之機構，另一方面對「私人檢察官公益訴訟」進行監督干預。最後關於「混合補償執法模式」，投保中心可輔助公部門執法，將公權力執法所得之罰金及不法所得分配予受害投資人，亦可仿效私部門的商業保險機制填補投資人的損失。

According to the traditional public/private law dichotomy, public agencies are responsible to prosecute wrongdoings that violate public interest (public enforcement), and injured individuals are eligible to file the litigation for their own compensation (private enforcement). But the line between public and private enforcement has become blurred in a multitude of enforcement areas, particularly in securities fraud context, in which securities fraud suits have been historically recognized as a classic ＂private attorney general (PAG)＂ that supplements or even interferes with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to deter securities fraud. Conversely, the SEC has provided defrauded investors restitution with Fair Fund composed of civil penalties and disgorgement collected by its public enforcement. However, the diversity of public-private (hybrid) enforcement options have received no theoretical or empirical attention in Taiwan. For this end, this Article illustrates that the PAG models display like a spectrum from the strongest to the weakest according to the degree of public intervention in private enforcement, thereby proposing three hybrid models: (1) The Hybrid Predomination Model, (2) The Hybrid Supervision Model, and (3) The Hybrid Compensation Model. By virtue of these innovative models, this Article argues that the de facto monopolistic securities fraud enforcer in Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Investor Protection Center (SFIPC), a nonprofit organization supported by the government, could apply these models to bring public and private enforcement goals into alignment. First, with respect to the Hybrid Predomination Model, this Article suggests that securities fraud suits can be allocated according to the enforcers' comparative inclinations and advantages, and the SFIPC should outsource resource-intensive cases to the private enforcer. Second, in terms of the Hybrid Supervision Model, the SFIPC can play a two-way supervisory role between the public and private sector, in which it can receive and review tips from whistleblowers to pick up any agency's slack, or it can dismiss or intervene in meritless private qui tam lawsuits on behalf of the government. Lastly, the Hybrid Compensation Model allows the SFIPC to serve as a vehicle for the government to provide civil relief for aggrieved shareholders through either distributing penalties and disgorgements via public enforcement to defrauded investors or insuring investor losses stemming from securities fraud via a risk-rating mechanism.

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