台灣地方財政的政治景氣循環分析：固定效果與隨機效果模型的估算比較

Political Business Cycles in Taiwan Local Fiscal Budget: An Estimation and Comparison between Fixed Effect and Random Effect Models

10.6683/TPSR.200612.10(2).63-100

王鼎銘(Ding-Ming Wang)；詹富堯(Fu-Yao Chan)

政治景氣循環理論 ； 地方政府預算 ； 固定效果模型 ； 隨機效果模型 ； political business cycle ； local government finance ； fixed effect model ； random effect model

台灣政治學刊

10卷2期（2006 / 12 / 01）

63 - 100

繁體中文

在民主國家政黨體制的運作下，執政當局常善於利用政策制定權及行政資源來製造選舉行情，藉著開立選舉支票或採行擴張性財政政策來刺激短期的經濟成長，以博取選民的支持，這種總體經濟表現可能伴隨選舉起伏波動的情形，即是所謂「政治景氣循環」（Political Business 台灣縣市政府的角度來看，雖然地方政府並無執行貨幣供給的政策工具，然而財政預算卻 Cycle）的現象。從台灣縣市政府的角度來看，雖然地方政府並無執行貨幣供給的政策工具，然而財政預算卻是地方施政計畫的具體表現，也是縣市首長重要的職權之一。故本文針對解嚴後台灣省二十一縣市相關的統計資料進行迴歸分析，來驗證地方政府支出預算是否存在政治景氣循環的現象。 研究結果發現，各縣市政府的歲出預算確實在選舉年有較為擴張的趨勢，符合投機派政治景氣循環(Opportunistic Political Business Cycle)理論的推論；相對地，縣市首長由哪一個政黨執政對於地方政府預算的編列並無顯著的影響，基本上也就不符合黨性派政治景氣循環(Partisan Political Business Cycle)理論的預期。此外，我們也發現預算規模具遞延效果，而且地方經濟發展程度也對預算具正面的影響力。最後，本文也發現在宋楚瑜職掌省府期間，縣市政府的財政預算確實存在擴張的情形。

The incumbents in a democracy tend to manipulate the economy by adopting expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate short-run expansion during electoral periods. By doing so, the macroeconomic performance is affected by the election and it is so called the political business cycle. In order to test whether policy instruments are affected by the election or not, this paper focuses on the electoral and partisan cycles in local budgets in Taiwan Province between 1988 and 2003. More specifically, we try to explore the scenario of political business cycle at local governments. The result shows that local governments' annual budgets do expand during the electoral years, which is corresponding to the theory of opportunistic political business cycle. On the other hand, we do not find the evidence to support the partisan political business cycle theory, since different incumbent parties have similar decision making for their budget during elections. Furthermore, we find a significant lag impact on the current budget setting. Finally, the empirical result reveals that local governments' budgets and expenditures expand during James Soong as a Chairman and Governor of Taiwan Provincial Government.

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