證券團體訴訟中因果關係構成要件的比較研究－兼論投保中心制度的改革方向

A Comparative Study on the Element of Causation in Securities Class Actions: A Reform Proposal for the Investor Protection Center

邵慶平(Ching-Ping Shao)

Basic案 ； Amgen案 ； Halliburton案 ； 詐欺市場理論 ； 交易因果關係 ； 損失因果關係 ； 投保中心 ； 持有人訴訟 ； Basic Amgen ； Halliburton ； Fraud-on-the-Market Theory ； Tran action Causation ； Loss Causation ； Investor Protection Center ； Holder Action

臺北大學法學論叢

99期（2016 / 09 / 01）

137 - 186

繁體中文

美國最高法院在Basic案中所肯認的詐欺市場理論在台灣已廣被接受，以賦予證券團體訴訟原告之交易因果關係存在的推定。在美國過去之通說認為詐欺市場理論應以效率資本市場假設為其適用前提，惟最高法院於2014年作成Halliburton案中指出此並非Basic案判決的真諦。相對而言，台灣法院在決定是否賦予交易因果關係的推定之前，即鮮少檢視台灣市場是否符合效率市場。再者，就損失因果關係而言，台灣學界的主流也傾向採取對原告有利的觀點，以免除或減輕其舉證責任。此與美國法制亦相當不同。經由詐欺市場理論在台灣與美國運用的比較，本文意圖突顯出交易因果關係之構成要件與證券團體訴訟的政策考量間的關聯。而損失因果關係在兩國所受之不同對待，也可從此一政策觀點加以瞭解。本文認為上述觀點就解釋論及立法論而言均有價值。就解釋論來看，其可以引導我們在台灣法制明文賦予訴權而美國Rule 10b-5卻不允許的案例類型，諸如持有人訴訟或是行為人過失的情形，思考是否允許交易因果關係的推定。而就證券團體訴訟改革的立法論來看，依此一觀點，劇烈的改革將會嚴重衝擊現有法條的解釋。據此，本文最後提出一個改革方案，以微調現行投保中心主導的體制。

The Fraud-on-the-Market (FOTM) theory, recognized in the Basic case by the Supreme Court of the United States, has been widely accepted in Taiwan to entitle the class action plaintiffs to the presumption of the existence of transaction causation. In the United States, it was suggested by the accepted wisdom that the FOTM theory i based on the efficient capital market hypothesis until the Supreme Court makes it clear in the Halliburton case in 2014 that this is a wrong interpretation of Basic. In the light of comparative law, from the beginning of the legal import, Taiwanese courts rarely examine the market efficiency before granting the presumption. Furthermore, the mainstream view in Taiwanese legal scholarship appears to favor the plaintiffs by relieving or mitigating the burden of proof in the element of loss causation. This is also very different from the U.S. regime. By juxtaposing the FOTM theories applied in the United States and in Taiwan, this article tried to shed light on the relationship between the element of transaction causation and the policy considerations for securities class actions. In addition the different treatment of loss causation in both regimes can also be better understood through the lens of policy making. This article argues that this insight is important in both perspectives of legal interpretation and policy change. In terms of legal interpretation, this insight can guide us in how to create the presumption of transaction causation in holder action and negligence cases, both of which can be raised in Taiwan but not allowed under the Rule 10b-5 in the United States. In terms of policy change on the securities class action regime, this article argues that a substantial reform would cause much disruption to the application of current rules, and offer a proposal to fine tune the Investor Protection Center-oriented system.

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