會計方法選擇與盈餘管理：以折舊方法為例

The Choice of Accounting Methods and Earnings Management: The Case of Depreciation Method

10.30139/JACG.200406.0004

林宜勉(Yi-Mien Lin)；王韶濱(Victoria Shao-Pin Wang)；陳世良(Shieh-Liang Chen)

會計方法選擇 ； 盈餘管理 ； 折舊提列方法 ； 混合均衡 ； 分離均衡 ； Accounting method choice ； Earnings management ； Depreciation method ； Pooling equilibrium ； Separating equilibrium

會計與公司治理

1卷1期（2004 / 06 / 01）

73 - 94

繁體中文

本文是利用不對稱資訊與訊號模式，考慮好壞兩種公司於不同破產成本下，分別導出成功與失敗公司會選擇相同折舊方法而無法揭露公司真實型態之混合均衡條件，以及成功公司所選擇之折舊方法不同於失敗公司，藉以誠實揭露公司型態時之分離均衡條件。為了驗證資本市場的實際現象是否與理論模式的結果一致，本文以新上市公司為例，探討影響管理當局的會計方法選擇（以折舊提列方法為例）的因素。此外，本文亦進一步將應計項目分為裁決性當期應計項目、非裁決性當期應計項目、裁決性長期應計項目與非裁決性長期應計項目，以分析這些盈餘管理變數與會計方法選擇的關係，以及這些項目是否會影響新上市公司在上市後二年內的股票異常報酬。 研究結論在理論模式方面為：(1)當投資者認為成功公司選擇淨利增加方法（直線折舊法）而失敗公司選擇淨利減少方法（加速折舊法）時，將可獲得成功公司與失敗公司皆會選擇直線折舊法的混合均衡條件，故無法揭露公司的真實型態。(2)當投資者認為成功公司會選擇加速折舊法而失敗公司會選擇直線折舊法，將可獲得成功公司選擇加速法而且失敗公司選擇直線法的分離均衡條件。 在實證研究方面為：(1)新上市前後負債權益比率較高的公司，愈有可能採用能增加盈餘的折舊方法以取信社會大眾。(2)在上市當年及上市後二年內資產報酬率愈高的公司，愈不需要藉由採用使會計盈餘增加的折舊法。(3)應計項目與折舊提列方法選擇無關的原因可能是：公司欲成功上市的方法很多，例如，利用銷貨給關係企業來窗飾經營成果；或因新上市公司通常規模不大，固定資產金額不高，故管理者利用折舊提列方法操縱損益的實質效果較小，致使其較無動機利用應計項目調整來影響折舊提列方法。(4)上市後第二年的非裁決性當期與長期應計項目，乃與異常報酬有顯著相關。此表示資本市場存在者管理者所無法控制的經濟與管制因素。

This paper combines asymmetry information and signaling models to show, under different bankruptcy costs, the conditions of pooling equilibrium for successful and failed firms that choose the same depreciation method but lead to different operating results. We also shows the conditions of separating equilibrium, for which successful firms choose different depreciation method to that of failed firms. To confirm whether the empirical results are consistent with the theory, the paper sampled initial public offering (IPO) companies to examine the factors that influence the choice of accounting methods (using depreciation methods as the example). Furthermore, the paper separate accrual items into discretionary current, non-discretionary current, discretionary long-term and non-discretionary long-term accrual items to analyze the relationship between these variables and the choice of accounting methods. The results of analytical models are: (1) When investors perceive that successful firms choose earnings increasing method (straight-line deprecation method) whereas failed firms choose earnings decreasing method (accelerate deprecation method), they are able to obtain the conditions of hybrid equilibrium. (2) When investors perceive successful firms will choose accelerate method, whereas failed firms choose straight-line method, they can obtain the conditions of separate equilibrium. Moreover, the empirical results show: (1) The companies that have higher debt-to-equity ratio before IPO tend to adopt earnings increasing method to gain the trust of the investor. (2) The companies that have higher assets returns in the year and two years after IPO tend not to adopt earnings increasing method. (3) Because there are many ways to have successful IPO, the impact of using depreciation methods to manipulate earnings is minimal. It reduces their motive of utilizing accrual items adjustment to affect depreciation method. (4) The non-discretionary current and long-term accrual items in the second year of IPO are significantly positively related to abnormal returns.

1. Ball, R. J.,P. Brown(1968).An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers.Journal of Accounting Research,6,159-178.
2. Beaver, W. H.(1968).The information content of annual earnings announcements.Journal of Accounting Research,6,67-92.
3. Browen, R. M.,L. DuCharme,S. D. Larry(1995).Stakeholders' implicit claims and accounting method choice.Journal of Accounting and Economics,20,255-295.
4. Christie, A.,J. L. Zimmerman(1994).Efficient and opportunistic choices of accounting procedures: corporate control contests.The Accounting Review,69,539-566.
5. Daley, L. A.,R. L. Vigeland(1983).The effect of debt covenants and political costs on the choice of accounting methods.Journal of Accounting and Economics,5,195-211.
6. DeFond, M. L.,J. Jiambalvo(1994).Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals.Journal of Accounting and Economics,17,145-176.
7. Duke, J. C.,H. G. Hunt(1990).An empirical examination of debt covenant restrictions and accounting-related debt proxies.Journal of Accounting and Economics,12,45-63.
8. Gosman, M.(1973).Characteristics of firms making accounting changes.The Accounting Review,48,1-11.
9. Hagerman, R. L.,M. E. Zmijewski(1979).Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice.Journal of Accounting and Economics,1,141-161.
10. Healy, P. M.(1985).The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decision.Journal of Accounting and Economics,7,85-107.
11. Holthausen, R. W.(1981).Evidence on the effect of bond covenants and management compensation contracts on the choice of accounting techniques.Journal of Accounting and Economics,3,79-109.
12. Holthausen, R. W.,R. W. Leftwich(1983).The economic consequences of accounting choice: implications of costly contracting and monitoring.Journal of Accounting and Economics,5,77-117.
13. Hughes, P. J.,E. S. Schwartz(1988).The LIFO/FIFO choice: an asymmetric information approach.Journal of Accounting Research,26,41-58.
14. Kumar, R.,P. R. Sopariwala(1992).The effect of adoption of long-term performance plans on stock prices and accounting numbers.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,27,561-573.
15. Lilien, S.,M. Mellman,V. Pastena(1988).Accounting changes: Successful versus unsuccessful firms.The Accounting Review,63,642-656.
16. Press, E. G.,J. B. Weintrop(1990).Accounting-based constraints in public and private debt agreements: the association with leverage and impact on accounting choice.Journal of Accounting and Economics,12,65-95.
17. Ronen, J.,S. Sadan(1981).Smoothing income numbers: Objectives, means, and implications.Readings, Mass:Addison-Wesley Pub. Co..
18. Subramanyam, K. R.(1996).The pricing of discretionary accruals.Journal of Accounting and Economics,22,249-281.
19. Sweeney, A. P.(1994).Debt-convenant violations and managers' accounting responses.Journal of Accounting and Economics,17,281-308.
20. Teoh, S. H.,I. Welch,T. J. Wong(1998).Earnings management and the long-run market performance of initial public offerings.Journal of Finance,53,1935-1974.
21. Watts, R. L.,J. L. Zimmerman(1979).The demand for and supply of accounting theories: The market for excuses.The Accounting Review,54,273-305.
22. Watts, R. L.,J. L. Zimmerman(1986).Positive Accounting Theory.Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall.
23. Watts, R. L.,J. L. Zimmerman(1978).Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards.The Accounting Review,53,112-134.
24. Watts, R. L.,J. L. Zimmerman(1990).Positive accounting theory: A ten year perspective.The Accounting Review,65,131-156.
25. Zmijewski, M. E.,R. L. Hagerman(1981).An income strategy approach to the positive theory of accounting standard setting/choice.Journal of Accounting and Economics,3,129-149.

1. 陳明進、張嘉文、陳明進、張嘉文(2014)。我國上市櫃公司採行 34 號公報第二次修訂規定之誘因：以交易目的股票重分類為備供出售為例。臺大管理論叢，25(1)，63-100。
2. 許慧雯、李佳臻(2017)。公司特性與董事會特徵影響金融業採用公允價值衡量之研究。會計與公司治理，12(1)，55-74。
3. 廖宜鋒、林有志(2006)。提前採用資產減損公報之公司特性及盈餘管理動機。文大商管學報，11(1)，11-28。
4. 林麗容、江淑玲(2007)。我國中小企業盈餘管理行為之探索性研究—德爾菲法之應用。東吳經濟商學學報，57，79-109。
5. 邱炳雲、林有志、何韋霆(2009)。盈餘門檻與盈餘管理行為之研究。會計與財金研究，2(2)，1-16。
6. 趙文彬、黃永成、李樑堅(2014)。內部人持股及重大財會政策與股價異常報酬關聯性之研究—兩岸上市公司之初探比較。兩岸金融季刊，2(3)，107-132。