The Determinants of Meeting Frequency for Board of Directors and Audit Committee

董事會與審計委員會開會次數的決定因素之研究：東亞驗證

10.29731/SJA.201205.0001

葉銀華(Yin-Hua Yeh)；許培基(Pei-Gi Shu)

公司治理 ； 董事會 ； 審計委員會 ； Corporate Governance ； Board of Directors ； Audit Committe

會計學報

4卷2期（2012 / 05 / 01）

1 - 30

英文

本文使用香港、新加坡、馬來西亞三個股巿的大型上巿公司為樣本，調查它們為何要揭露董事會與審計委員會開會次數，以及開會次數多寡的決定因素。我們首先發現家族控股公司比較不會揭露開會次數。再者本文提出巿場壓力假說，認為當控制股東現金流量權偏離投票權愈大的公司，其屬於鞏固職位型，比較會揭露開會次數；而獨立董事比率高的公司，在巿場壓力下，亦比較會揭露開會次數。而控制股東現金流量權愈高、過去績效較佳的公司，其屬於正面誘因者，比較沒有市場壓力，因此比較不用揭露開會次數，以及有揭露者亦開比較少次的會議。本文的實證結果，在揭露董事會與審計委員會開會次數，以及開會次數多寡，具有一致性。

Using 450 listed firms in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, the three regions that were once the colonies of the U.K. and inherit the same Anglo-American legal system, we investigate the issue of why firms would like to reveal board meeting information and how frequent the meetings are scheduled. We propose the market pressure hypothesis indicating that the listed firms, especially for family controlled ones, would passively react to outside pressure in the decision of whether to disclose board meeting information and calling meetings. The empirical evidences show that the listed firms with family controlling owner entitled higher cash flow rights are associated with lower odds of information disclosure. In contrast, the voting-cash flow deviation associated with the controlling owners, being characterized as an entrenching motive, is positively associated with the odds of disclosure. Moreover, the odds of disclosure are positively associated with board independence. Finally, firms with inferior performance measures are more likely to be demanded of meeting information disclosure. The results in general hold water both for the board of directors and theaudit committee, and are sustainable for the decision of meeting information disclosure and the decision of meeting frequency setting.

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