台灣企業公司治理與公司下市櫃之關聯性分析

The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firms' Delisting of Taiwanese Firms

蔡璧徽(Bi-Huei Tsai)；王志成(Chi-Chen Wang)

公司治理 ； 存活分析 ； 繼續經營疑慮 ； 機構投資人 ； Corporate Governance ； Survival Analysis ； Going-Concern ； Institutional Investor

商略學報

1卷1期（2009 / 12 / 01）

41 - 56

繁體中文

本研究運用存活參數模式(parametric models of duration)針對會計師簽發繼續經營假設有疑慮意見的台灣上市櫃公司，探討機構投資人持股比率、董監事股權質押比率、董事長兼任總經理參與管理、公司獨立董監事的設立等和公司下市櫃風險之關聯性。實證結果發現董監持股質押比率愈高，公司下市櫃風險也愈高，而是否設立獨立董監事也是影響下市櫃的顯著因素。此外，公司上市櫃的時間長短，權益市價對總負債比率，銷貨收入對總資產比率，皆是影響公司下市櫃的顯著因素；尤其，本研究發現自會計師簽發繼續經營假設有疑慮的意見後，樣本公司下市櫃機率會先持續上升，在第28季達到最高點後，則緩緩往下降，表示台灣公司產生繼續經營疑慮之訊息公布後前7年是公司下市櫃的危險期。

This study employs Taiwanese firms that received ”going-concern” opinions from auditors between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 2008 as our sample, and applies parametric models of duration to investigate the impact of corporate governance on the delisting of firms. Also, we examine whether the probability of delisting a firm is related to institutional investor ownership, pledge ratios of directors and supervisors, management participation, and board seats of the independent supervisors. The empirical results show a higher delisting risk for firms with greater pledge ratios of directors and supervisors. In addition, the listing period or equity to debt ratio of a firm is significantly associated with its delisting risk. In particular, the probability of delisting increases to its highest point 28 quarters after auditors issue a ”going-concern” opinion. Afterwards, the probability of delisting decreases slowly. These findings imply that the riskiest period for delisting is the seven years after auditors issue a ”going-concern” opinion.

1. 許溪南、歐陽豪、陳慶芳(2007)。公司治理、盈餘管理與財務預警模型之建構。會計與公司治理，4(1)，85-121。
   連結：
2. Fuerst, O. and Kang, S.-H., 2000. Corporate governance, expected operating performance, and pricing, Working Paper, Yale school of Management.
3. Bhagat, S. and Black, B., 1994. Board independent and long-term performance, Law and Economic Working paper, Stanford Law School.
4. Agrawal, A.,Knoeber, C.(1996).Firm Performance and Mechanism to Control Agency Problem between Managers and Shareholders.Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,31(3),377-397.
5. Altman, E.(1968).Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy.Journal of Finance,23(4),589-609.
6. Bandopadhyaya, A.,Jaggia, S.(2001).An Analysis of Second Time Around Bankruptcies Using a Split-Population Duration Model.Journal of Empirical Finance,8(2),201-218.
7. Beaver, W.(1966).Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure.Journal of Accounting Research,4,71-111.
8. Brickley, J. A.,Coles, J. L.,Jarrell, G.(1997).Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board.Journal of Corporate Finance,3(3),189-220.
9. Byrd, J.,Hickman, K.(1992).The Case for Independent Outside Directors.Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,5(3),78-82.
10. Chen, K.,Lee, J.(1993).Financial Ratios and Corporate Endurance: a Case of the Oil and Gas Industry.Contemporary Accounting Research,9(2),667-694.
11. Classens, S.,Diankov, S.,Fan, J. P. H.,Lang, L. H. P.(1999).Research Paper, World BankResearch Paper, World Bank,World Bank.
12. Daily, C. M.,Dalton, D. R.(1994).Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance: the Impact of Borard Composition and Structure.Academy of Management Journal,37(6),1603-1617.
13. Fama, E. F.(1980).Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.Journal of political Economy,88(2),288-307.
14. Goodstein, J.,Gautam, K.,Boeker, W.(1994).The Effects of Board Size and Diversity on Strategic Change.Strategic Management Journal,15(3),241-250.
15. Jensen, M. C.(1993).The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exist, And the Failure of Internal Control System.Journal of Finance,48(3),831-880.
16. Lorsch, J. W.,Lipton, M.(1993).A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance.The Business Lawyer,48(1),55-77.
17. McConnell, J. J.,Stervaes, H.(1990).Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value.Journal of Financial Economics,27(2),595-612.
18. Ohlson, J.(1980).Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy.Journal of Accounting Research,18(1),109-131.
19. Patton, A.,Baker, J. C.(1987).Why do not directors Rock the Boat?.Harvard Business Review,66,10-12.
20. Pound, J.(1988).Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight.Journal of Financial Economics,20(1),237-265.
21. Richard, M. D.,Womack, J. A.,Allaway, A. W.(1993).Marketing Myopia: An Integrated View.The Journal of Product and Brand Management,2(3),49-54.
22. Rosenstein, S.,Wyatt, J. G.(1990).Outside Directors, Board Independence, And Shareholder Wealth.Journal of Financial Economics,26(2),175-191.
23. Singh, H.,Harianto, F.(1989).Top Management Tenure, Corporate Ownership Structure and the Magnitude of Golden Parachutes.Strategic Management Journal,10,143-156.
24. Vance, N.(1983).Corporate Leadership: Boards, Directors, and Strategy.New York:McGrawltill.
25. Weisbach, M. S.(1988).Outside Directors and CEO Turnover.Journal of Financial Economics,20(1-2),431-460.
26. 何幸芳(2003)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。輔仁大學金融所。
27. 吳昆皇(1995)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。國立台灣大學商業研究所。
28. 李紀珠(1993)。金融機構失敗預測模型─加速失敗時間模型之應用。經濟論文叢刊，21(4)，355-379。
29. 周真貞(1998)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。國立中山大學企業管理研究所。
30. 林君玲(1999)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。國立台灣大學會計學研究所。
31. 林惠玲(1993)。廠商之退出率與存活時間之計量模型─台灣電力及電子機械器材製造業的驗證。經濟論文叢刊，21(4)，411-440。
32. 高蘭芬(2002)。博士論文(博士論文)。國立成功大學會計研究所。
33. 黃振豐、呂紹強(2000)。企業財務危機預警模式之研究─以財務及非財務因素構建。當代會計，1(1)，19-40。
34. 楊麗弘(1999)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。長庚大學管理學研究所。
35. 熊大中(2000)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。國立成功大學會計研究所。
36. 謝淑娟(1994)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。國立交通大學管理科學研究所。

1. 吳佳育(2016)。存活分析模型於股權型群眾募資之探討。中原大學企業管理學系學位論文。2016。1-96。