董監事暨重要職員責任保險與資訊揭露品質及企業舞弊關係之研究

Effects of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance on Information Disclosure Quality and Corporate Fraud

10.6538/TAR.2015.1101.03

劉若蘭(Jo‐Lan Liu)；劉政淮(Cheng‐Hwai Liou)；簡溥銘(Pu‐Ming Jian)

董監事暨重要職員責任保險 ； 資訊揭露品質 ； 企業舞弊 ； 公司治理 ； directors' & officers' liability insurance ； information disclosure quality ； corporate fraud ； corporate governance

中華會計學刊

11卷1期（2015 / 07 / 01）

79 - 114

繁體中文

過去有關董監事暨重要職員責任保險（簡稱D&O保險）之研究著重於D&O保險的需求、發展與未來展望。本文以台灣2007年至2012年之上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討D&O保險與公司資訊揭露的品質以及舞弊發生的可能性之關聯性。實證結果發現，相較於未投保D&O保險之公司，已投保D&O保險之公司，其資訊揭露品質較高且發生舞弊的可能性較低。此外，D&O保險之保險額度亦與資訊揭露品質呈現正向相關，而與舞弊發生的可能性呈負向關係。整體而言，本文結果支持公司投保D&O保險對董監事暨重要職員具有激勵誘因效果，不但能促使董監事審慎經營管理公司，以提升公司的資訊透明度，並且能抑制公司發生舞弊的可能性。

Most of the prior researches on the directors' and officers' (hereafter D&O ) liability insurance have concentrated on its demands, determinants, or developments in the future. The purpose of this study is to investigate the association between D&O liability insurance coverage and the information disclosure quality and the incidence of corporate fraud for firms publicly listed in Taiwan for the period from 2007 to 2012. The empirical results show that the companies with D&O liability insurance coverage have higher information disclosure quality and have lower probability of fraud occurrence than those of companies without D&O insurance. Besides, there is a positive relation between D&O insurance coverage limits and information disclosure quality and a negative relation between D&O insurance coverage limits and the incidence of corporate fraud. Overall, the empirical results generally support the incentive motivation effects of the D&O insurance coverage for the directors and officers. The D&O insurance coverage not only leads the directors and officers to act prudently to increase the corporate information transparency but also depresses the incidence of corporate fraud.

1. Chen, T.-J.,Chang, J.-I.(2011).Corporate governance: Directors' liability and board structure.Management Review,30(3),1-23.
   連結：
2. 林嬋娟、張哲嘉(2009)。董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性。會計評論，48(1)，1-33。
   連結：
3. 陳彩稚、龐嘉慧(2008)。董監事暨重要職員責任保險之需求因素分析。台大管理論叢，18(2)，171-195。
   連結：
4. 陳瑞斌、許崇源(2007)。公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究。交大管理學報，27(2)，55-109。
   連結：
5. Boyer, M. M. 2005. "Directors' and officers' insurance and shareholder protection." Working paper, HEC Montreal
6. Abbott, L. J.,Park, Y.,Parker, S.(2000).The effects of audit committee activity and independence on corporate fraud.Managerial Finance,26(11),55-68.
7. Ashbaugh-Skaife, H.,Collins, D. W.,LaFond, R.(2006).The effects of corporate governance on firms' credit ratings.Journal of Accounting and Economics,42(1-2),203-243.
8. Beasley, M. S.(1996).An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud.The Accounting Review,71(4),443-465.
9. Beasley, M. S.,Carcello, J. V.,Hermanson, D. R.,Lapides, P. D.(2000).Fraudulent financial reporting: Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms.Accounting Horizons,14(4),441-454.
10. Becker, C. L.,DeFond, M. L.,Jiambalvo, J.,Subramanyam, K. R.(1998).The effect of audit quality on earnings management.Contemporary Accounting Research,15(1),1-24.
11. Bhaget, S.,Brickley, J. A.,Coles, J. L.(1987).Managerial indemnification and liability insurance: The effect on shareholder wealth.Journal of Risk and Insurance,54(4),721-736.
12. Botosan, C. A.(1997).Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital.The Accounting Review,72(3),323-349.
13. Boubakri, N.,Cosset, J.-C.,Saffar, W.(2012).The impact of political connections on firms' operating performance and financing decisions.Journal of Financial Research,35(3),397-423.
14. Boyer, M. M.,Stern, L. H.(2012).Is corporate governance risk valued? Evidence from directors' and officers' insurance.Journal of Corporate Finance,18(2),349-72.
15. Carcello, J. V.,Nagy, A. L.(2004).Audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting.Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory,23(2),55-69.
16. Cerbioni, F.,Parbonetti, A.(2007).Exploring the effects of corporate governance on intellectual capital disclosure: An analysis of European biotechnology companies.European Accounting Review,16(4),791-826.
17. Chalmers, J. M. R.,Dann, L. Y.,Harford, J.(2002).Managerial opportunism? Evidence from directors' and officers' insurance purchases.The Journal of Finance,57(2),609-636.
18. Chen, C. J. P.,Jaggi, B.(2000).Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong.Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,19(4-5),285-310.
19. Chen, G.,Firth, M.,Gao, D. N.,Rui, O. M.(2006).Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: Evidence from China.Journal of Corporate Finance,12(3),424-448.
20. Chen, T.-J.,Li, S.-H.(2010).Director' & officers' insurance, corporate governance and firm performance.International Journal of Disclosure and Governance,7(3),244-261.
21. Chi, H.-Y.,Weng, T.-C.(2014).Managerial legal liability and Big 4 auditor choice.Journal of Business Research,67(9),1857-1869.
22. Chi, W.,Lisic, L. L.,Pevzner, M.(2011).Is enhanced audit quality associated with greater real earnings management?.Accounting Horizons,25(2),315-335.
23. Chung, H. H.,Wynn, J. P.(2008).Managerial legal liability coverage and earnings conservatism.Journal of Accounting and Economics,46(1),135-153.
24. Chung, H. H.,Wynn, J. P.(2014).Corporate governance, directors' and officers' insurance premiums and audit fees.Managerial Auditing Journal,29(2),173-195.
25. Chung, H. H.,Wynn, J. P.,Yi, H.(2013).Litigation risk, accounting quality, and investment efficiency.Advances in Accounting,29(2),180-185.
26. Core, J. E.(1997).On the corporate demand for directors' and officers' insurance.The Journal of Risk and Insurance,64(1),63-87.
27. Core, J. E.(2000).The directors' and officers' insurance premium: An outside assessment of the quality of corporate governance.The Journal of Law Economics and Organization,16(2),449-477.
28. Daniels, R. J.,Hutton, S. M.(1993).The capricious cushion: The implications of the directors' and officers' liability insurance crisis on Canadian corporate governance.Canadian Business Law Journal,22(2),182-230.
29. Dechow, P. M.,Sloan, R. G.,Sweeney, A. P.(1996).Causes and consequences of earnings manipulations: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC.Contemporary Accounting Research,13(1),1-36.
30. Diamond, D. W.,Verrecchia, R. E.(1991).Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital.The Journal of Finance,46(4),1325-1359.
31. Fama, E. F.,Jensen, M. C.(1983).Separation of ownership and control.Journal of Law and Economics,26(2),301-325.
32. Farber, D. B.(2005).Restoring trust after fraud: Does corporate governance matter?.The Accounting Review,80(2),539-561.
33. Francis, J.,LaFond, R.,Olsson, P. M.,Schipper, K.(2004).Costs of equity and earnings attributes.The Accounting Review,79(4),967-1010.
34. Frankel, R. M.,Johnson, M. F.,Nelson, K. K.(2002).The relation between auditors' fees for nonaudit services and earnings management.The Accounting Review,77(1),71-105.
35. Frankel, R.,Johnson, M.,Skinner, D. J.(1999).An empirical examination of conference calls as a voluntary disclosure medium.Journal of Accounting Research,37(1),133-150.
36. Griffith, S. J.(2006).Uncovering a gatekeeper: Why the SEC should mandate disclosure of details concerning directors' & officers' liability insurance policies.University of Pennsylvania Law Review,154(5),1147-1208.
37. Gutiérrez, M.(2003).An economic analysis of corporate directors' fiduciary duties.The Rand Journal of Economics,34(3),516-535.
38. Ho, S. S. M.,Wong, K. S.(2001).A study of the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure.Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation,10(2),139-156.
39. Holderness, C. G.(1990).Liability insurers as corporate monitors.International Review of Law and Economics,10(2),115-129.
40. Hunton, J.,Libby, R.,Mazza, C. L.(2006).Financial reporting transparency and earnings management.The Accounting Review,81(1),135-157.
41. Jensen, M. C.(1993).The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems.The Journal of Finance,48(3),831-880.
42. Klein, A.(2002).Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management.Journal of Accounting and Economics,33(3),375-400.
43. Lang, M. H.,Lundholm, R. J.(1996).Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior.The Accounting Review,71(4),467-492.
44. Li, K.-F.,Liao, Y.-P.(2014).Directors' and officers' liability insurance and investment efficiency: Evidence from Taiwan.PacifiC-Basin Finance Journal,29,18-34.
45. Lu, J.-H.(2005).National Central University.
46. Minutti-Meza, M.(2013).Does auditor industry specialization improve audit quality?.Journal of Accounting Research,51(4),779-817.
47. O'Sullivan, N.(2002).The demand for directors' and officers' insurance by large UK companies.European Management Journal,20(5),574-583.
48. O'Sullivan, N.(1997).Insuring the agents: The role of directors' and officers' insurance in corporate governance.The Journal of Risk and Insurance,64(3),545-556.
49. Persons, O. S.(2005).The relation between the new corporate governance rules and the likelihood of financial statement fraud.Review of Accounting and Finance,4(2),125-148.
50. Priest, G. L.(1987).The current insurance crisis and modern tort law.The Yale Law Journal,96(7),1521-1590.
51. Sharma, V. D.(2004).Board of director characteristics, institutional ownership, and fraud: Evidence from Australia.Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory,23(2),105-117.
52. Tsai, C.-C.,Wu, C.-C.,Chang, R.-D.(2012).Effects of overvalued equity and managerial incentives on corporate policy.Emerging Markets Finance & Trade,48,74-87.
53. Warfield, T. D.,Wild, J. J.,Wild, K. L.(1995).Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings.Journal of Accounting and Economics,20(1),61-91.
54. Welker, M.(1995).Disclosure policy, information asymmetry, and liquidity in equity markets.Contemporary Accounting Research,11(2),801-827.
55. Xie, B.,Davidson, W. N., III,Dadalt, P. J.(2003).Earnings management and corporate governance: The role of the board and the audit committee.Journal of Corporate Finance,9(3),295-316.
56. 李書行(2007)。行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫,行政院國家科學委員會。
57. 周建宏(2002)。提高資訊透明度以因應全球化的資本市場。會計研究月刊，200，78-86。
58. 陳美姝(2003)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。國立交通大學管理科學學程。
59. 黃寶漳(2004)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。明志技術學院工程管理研究所。
60. 廖益興(2010)。董事會組成、股權結構與年報資訊揭露水準。台大管理論叢，20(2)，209-249。
61. 劉亭均(2008)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。國立台灣大學會計學研究所。

1. 黎書豪(2017)。企業避稅與董監事暨重要職員責任保險之關聯性。中原大學會計學系學位論文。2017。1-65。 
2. 黃劭彥(Shaio-Yan Huang);鍾宇軒(Yu-Hsuan Chung);黃郁婷(Yu-Ting Huang);蕭又菁(Yu-Ching Hsiao)(2024)。審計委員會席次、出席率對公司財報品質影響－以董監事責任險的調節效果。中山管理評論。32(1)。99-147。 
3. 游景棠(2017)。董監事責任險與公司價值之研究。臺中科技大學會計資訊系碩士班學位論文。2017。1-30。