張東蓀是何意義的“唯心主義者”？－張東蓀的“唯心主義者”標籤及其自評析論

What is Meant by Chang Tung-sun as a Foremost "Idealist"?-A Closer Look at the Imposed Label in the Light of His Various Clarifications and Repeated Disvowals

10.6353/BIMHAS.200106.0067

葉其忠(Key-Chong Yap)

唯心主義者張東蓀 ； Chang Tung-sun as an Idealist

近代史研究所集刊

35期（2001 / 06 / 01）

67 - 143

繁體中文

在閱讀許多人評論張氏的文字中常常看到本題目所指的稱謂，而在閱讀張氏自己的著作中卻常常看到他自己的澄清，甚或否認自己是「唯心論者」。因此我們就有了一個他人評價和自評的差距。本文就是針對這個差距而來，主要的目的是澄清個中問題，並就所涉及的意義稍加討論。 中文裡的「唯心主義」一語常用來翻譯英語”idea-ism=idealism”和”ideal-ism”。但嚴格講來，在中文裡還有三個詞都可用來指稱。”idea-ism=idealism”和”ideal-ism”，即(1)「唯心論」；(2)「觀念論」；(3)「理想主義」。此外，張本人也曾用「意象論」來譯”idea-ism=idealism”。就張而言，用「意象論」、「唯心論」或「觀念論」來譯認識論上的”idea-ism=idealism”是不錯的；但用「意象論」、唯心論」或「觀念論」來譯本體論、宇宙論上的”idea-ism=idealism”，和”ideal-ism”，則比不上「理想主義」好。 關於張東蓀是甚麼意義下的「唯心主義者」或「新唯心主義者」，大致有三大類別：(1)馬列或左派學者以及其附和者所用的「反動的」「唯心主義者」或「反動的」「新唯心主義者」稱謂；(2)非馬列或非左派學者所用的沒有「反動的」之類形容詞的「唯心主義者」或「新唯心主義者」稱謂；(3)張東蓀自己對「唯心主義者」或「新唯心主義者」稱謂的判別。無疑的，(3)最重要，不但是因為它最權威，同時以前也沒有人如此注意到它是評價張東蓀是何意義下的「唯心主義者」或「新唯心主義者」的關鍵。 張東蓀在認識論上的「多元主義」和「交互主義」是使他不可能是馬、列派所指稱的「唯心論者」最根本且最具體的理由。我們也看到張之不願領受「唯心主義者」，除了哲學上（尤其是認識論）的考慮外，也有社會和政治的考慮。雖然張不是柏拉圖主義者，他卻可因其承認思想中之有先天成分而毫無困難地被看成是個「康德主義者」。同時，他也確是個「理想主義者」，因為他一向強調觀念或理想在文化上之極端重要性。 張東蓀不是一般意義的「唯心論者」，最重要的認識論上的原因必須從他純哲學或純學術的態度去理解，唯有從這個角度出發才能明白導致他最終成為綜合論者的內在力量。總之，若一定要用「唯心主義者」的稱謂於張身上，則最可能的地方是他的認識論，因為他承認是站在「唯心主義的立腳點」上。以此觀之，最明顯的一點，是他絕不可能是馬克思派的「唯物論者」或「辯證唯物論者」，雖然他在政治、社會、經濟領域的思想有某種他所理解的「唯物論」色彩。 張東蓀基本上可說是多元理想主義的綜合論者，或更正確地說，張東蓀既是理想主義者、也是多元論者、更是綜合論者。雖然他有些強烈唯心論的傾向，而被許多非馬列派學者和所有馬列派學者看成是唯心主義者或新唯心主義者。張東蓀之所以有唯心主義者或新唯心主義的傾向，是因為他對唯心主義或新唯心主義有深刻的了解，而他不是唯心主義者或新唯心主義者，也是因為他對唯心主義者或新唯心主義者或新唯心主義的了解，才使他不能成為全面的唯心主義者或新唯心主義者。 哲學爭論雖是言詞之爭，但卻涉及基本價值判斷，因為所有指涉的對象是抽象的，在外在的、客觀的指涉不易確定時，最容易以立場、價值判斷取代追索對象的本相。張東蓀也曾多次澄清自己不領受「唯心主義者」的頭銜。若我們仍要繼續以「唯心主義者」稱呼他，則我們至少得留意他之所以不願如此自居的苦心孤詣。

In reading on and about as well as around the study of Chang Tung-sun, I have constantly come across the label ”idealist” informing the first part of the second half of the title of this article, while in reading Chang's own works, I have often been intrigued by his various clarifications and even repeated disvowals informing the second part of the second half of the title, and thus providing the opportunity for posing the question asked in the first half of the title. The aim of this article is to take a closer look at the matter, with a view to emphasizing the fact that any name-calling is by no means insignificant, as it may lead to loss of position, intellectual leadership, and political persecution as happened in Chang's case. In Chinese language, the term 「唯心主義」 is often used to translate the English terms ”idea-ism=idealism” and ”ideal-ism” or their equivalents in other European laguanges. But strictly speaking, there are also other three Chinese terms being used to refer to ”idea-ism=dealism” and ”ideal-ism”, namely, (1) 「唯心論」, (2)「觀念論」, and (3)「理想主義」. Besdes, Chang himself also used the Chinese term 「意象論」 to translate ”idea-ism=idealism”. For him, the use of 「意象論」, 「唯心論」, and 「觀念論」 to refer to ”idea-ism=idealism” in epistemology is fine; but the use of 「意象論」, 「唯心論」, and 「觀念論」 to refer to ”idea-ism=idealism” and ”ideal-ism” in ontology and cosmology is not as preferable as the use of the Chinese term 「理想主義」. With respect to what is meant by Chang Tung-sun as an ”idealist” or ”neo-idealist”, there are three distinguishable categories: (1) the ”reactionary” ”anti-Marxist”, ”anti-materialist”, and ”anti-dialectic” ”idealist” or ”neo-idealist” name-calling as used by Chinese Marxists and their followers; (2) the common ”idealist” or ”neo-idealist” appellation without the attached adjectives ”reactionary” and ”anti-Marxist” etc., as used by non-Marxist and non-leftist Chinese and others; and (3) Chang's own distinctive usages of the terms ”idealist” or ”neo-idealist”. It is no gainsaying that of the three categories, (3) is the most important for our understanding of Chang's own various clarifications and repeated disvowals. These clarifications and disavowals are the most authoritative, and have not been systematically looked into before as the crux in solving the query posed in the title of this article. Chang's epistemological ”pluralism” and ”interactionalism” most cogently, fundamentally and concretely accounted for his not being an ”idealist” in the sense as understood by Chinese Marxists and their followers. Besides philosophy (especially epistemological considerations), there were also social and political factors informing Chang's unwilling to receive the title ”idealist” as understood by the non-Maxists. Though admittedly, Chang was not a Platonist, he could without difficulty be called a ”Kantian” of sorts, given his acknowledgement that there are a priori elements in thought however defined. In the meantime, he was certainly and above all an ”ideal-ist”, for he always emphasized the extreme importance of ideas or ideals in culture. The most important reason why Chang was not an ”idealist” in the ordinary sense lay in his epistemology, which in turn resulted from his purely philosophical or academic attitude towards the pursuit of knowledge. In a word, if one is bound to use the term ”idealist” to him, the most appropriate place seems to be in his epistemology, because he himself acknowledged that he stood on ”the standpoint of idealism”. As seen from this perspective, the most conspicuous point is that he certainly was not a Marxist ”materialist” or ”dialectical materialist”, though his thought in the fields of politics, society and economics has certain elements of ”materialism” as he understood it. Chang was basically a pluralistic idealistic synthesist/eclectic, or more appropriately, he was both an ideal-ist and pluralist, and above all a synthesist/eclectic, though with strong idea-listic tendency, which accounted for his being called ”idea-list” or ”neo-idea-list” by many non-Marxists and all Marxists and their followers. The reason why there was an idea-list or neo-idea-list tendency in his thought lay in his profound understanding of what idea-lism or neo-idea-lism was, to which also owed why he could not be an all-out idea-list or neo-idea-list. Though philosophical controversy basically takes on a verbal form, it involves fundamental value judgment, because the object under contention here is abstract, and in the absence of any certainty easily identifiable in the external reality, one's standpoint and value judgment can most easily take the place of the object under pursuit. Chang had more than once clarified that he could not accept the title of an ”idealist”. And if we still insist on calling him such, then we have at least to take note why he was so painstakingly unwilling to claim the honour.

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