台灣上市櫃公司核心代理問題之研究

洪嘉穗

doi:10.6846/TKU.2016.00129

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台湾上市柜公司核心代理问题之研究

A Study of Core Agency Problem in Taiwan

洪嘉穗 , 硕士　　导师：黄振豊;孔繁华　　

繁体中文 DOI： 10.6846/TKU.2016.00129

核心代理问题；控制权；盈余分配权； Core Agent Problem ； Control ； Authority of Surplus Distribution

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摘要 │ 参考文献 (39) │ 国际计量

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The study is to survey the core agent problem of listed companies and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan, and to examine whether there are differences between the factors in affecting core agent problems under different controls of enterprises. Due to the specificities of ownership structure and the operations of family business in Taiwan, the pyramidal structure and cross shareholdings are utilized to control shareholders with strengthened predominance, and as well as the outer forces are employed to control the board of trustees, making deviations of control and the authorities of surplus distribution by direct management participation.
To evaluate the magnitudes of encroachment of wealth of small shareholders by shareholders, the deviations of shares of control and authorities of surplus distribution are calculated, and to evaluate the strengths of encroachment effects and business incentives of shareholders, the deviations of seats control and authorities of surplus distribution are estimated. The results represent that enterprises with different types of control, the scales of enterprise, and industries would affect the magnitudes of deviation. Professional managers without family controls gives the greatest degree of deviation, and the same appearances would also be emerged in poor corporate performance, electronics industry, and listed companies; the larger the scale of company, the larger the degree of deviation. Furthermore, to compare with the enterprises without family control, the deviations of the surplus of shares and seats of family enterprises are low; it insinuates that family enterprises possess the utmost business incentives to eliminate agent conflicts. On the other hand, the deviation would be expanded when complicated reinvestment approaches such as pyramidal structure or cross shareholdings are utilized, manipulating the shareholders to jeopardize the interests of small shareholders via the spurs of self-interest incentives and making companies fall down in business performance eventually; the business performance is negative correlated to the seat control of the deviation of authorities of surplus distribution in family-control enterprises. 
There are 64.17% of family-control enterprises in the entire samples of study, it reveals that the ownership and franchise are over concentrated and as well as the manipulations of the seats of the board of trustees are usually adopted to intensify the controls of shareholders to accord cost effectiveness, which represents voting rights. The consequences demonstrate the relationships between the control of business decision of shareholders and the investments are low. On the other hand, different regulations are merely based upon the differentiation of listed companies and over-the-counter companies, or distinctions of industries by the supervision mechanism of domestic authorities, the study recommends that the supervision mechanism could be established by the basis of the degree of dispersion of equity, to prevent the losses of small shareholders and enterprises from the captures of shareholders with their self-interests.

参考文献 ( 39 ) 〈TOP〉

王元章与张椿柏，2011，从核心代理问题的角度探讨股权结构，董事会特性对公司价值之影响，证券市场发展季刊，第23卷第2期：131-174。
连结：
林宛莹、许崇源，2008，台湾集团企业之控股型态及公司治理衡量指标之研究与建议，交大管理学报，第28卷第1期：269-312。
连结：
林惠芬、陈嬿如、吴清在，2012，委托书之代理问题及制衡机制：对控制权偏离暨少数股东侵占行为之实证研究，会计评论，第54期，2012/1，第1-42页。
连结：
林翠蓉、张力、侯启娉、曾韵如、许雅棠，2010，家族所有权、公司治理与公司绩效关系之实证研究，绩效与策略研究，第8卷第1期：59-78。
连结：
沈中华、陈锦村与吴孟纹，2005，更早期预警模型：台湾银行业道德指标的建立及影响，管理学报，第22卷第1期：1-28。
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DOI可强化引用精确性、增强学术圈连结，并给予使用者跨平台的良好使用经验，目前在全世界已有超过五千万个对象申请DOI。如想对DOI的使用与概念有进一步了解，请参考（）。