核心代理問題與盈餘管理：董事會結構與外部監督機制之探討

張瑞當; 方俊儒; 曾玉琦

doi:10.6504/JOM.2007.24.01.02

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P17 - 39

社会科学 > 管理学

DOI： 10.6504/JOM

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核心代理问题与盈余管理：董事会结构与外部监督机制之探讨

Central Agency Problem and Earnings Management: An Investigation of Board Structure and External Monitoring Mechanism

张瑞当(Ruey-Dang Chang) ；方俊儒(Chun-Ju Fang) ；曾玉琦(Yee-Chy Tseng)

管理学报； 24 卷 1 期 (2007 / 02 / 01) ， P17 - 39

繁体中文 DOI： 10.6504/JOM.2007.24.01.02

核心代理问题；盈余管理；控制权；盈余分配权； Central Agency Problem ； Earnings Management ； Control Rights ； Cash Flow Rights

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摘要 │ 参考文献 (76) │ 被引用文献 (5) │ 国际计量

摘要〈TOP〉

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The almost continuous and well-publicized major financial scandals of public companies in recent years in many countries, including Taiwan and the U.S., have greatly raised concerns on the inadequacy of protecting investors and other stakeholders. Many countries have since introduced legislations and installed new monitoring bodies to improve financial reporting quality and enhance protections of stakeholders. Thus, improving financial reporting quality and eliminating earnings management is an important and yet very challenging issue.
A common characteristic shared by many public companies involved in financial scandals is that many major shareholders of firms involved in financial scandals also hold management positions in the same company. The failure to separate business ownership and management control when there are other shareholders creates a ”central agency problem” between the major and the minority shareholders. This problem is much more serious in Taiwan than in other countries because it is common for the companies in Taiwan to gain control rights of another public company through cross-holdings. The less than desired information transparency of companies in Taiwan makes the central agency problem even worse. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the central agency problem is a significant factor in earnings management behavior. In addition, this study also examines two other factors that have been documented to have significant effects on earnings management behavior: structure of the board of directors and external monitoring mechanism.
The study collects research data from 1996 to 2004 of the public companies from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database and uses the discretionary accruals as the proxy for earnings management. Corporate governance data are also obtained from TEJ to estimate the control rights, cash flow rights, and their differences. The empirical results indicate that when managers of the companies have more control rights than cash flow rights, which results in a central agency problem, managers are more likely to manage earnings. Such behavior is likely conducted for managers' self-interests and at the expenses of the companies and other minority shareholders. The results also show that firms engage in more earnings management as the collateralized shares of board members increase, possibly a result of the personal funds of the board members being affected by the stock price of the companies. The results also show that as the shares controlled by institutional investors increase and as the size of the board of the directors increases, managers engage in less earnings management behavior. One explanation is that institutional investors own, usually, more shares than an individual shareholder and, therefore, have incentives to monitor the operating activities of the companies. Furthermore, institutions have the resources and abilities to carry out effective monitoring of the management. With activities of the firm being monitored closely by institutional shareholders, managers' earnings management behavior will be inhibited or contained. Finally, as the size of the board increases, the board is likely to have more members with different professional backgrounds and experiences. Thus, a large board can better monitor managers than a small board and thus contain managers' earnings management behavior.
Unlike the traditional agency problem between managers and outside shareholders that was first exposed in Berle and Means (1932) and has since been examined extensively in the literature, this study examines the central agency problem. The existing literature has attempted to employ the traditional agency theory to account for the behavior of earnings management and yielded inconsistent results. This study focuses on the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights in examining companies' earnings management behavior. Through this effort, results of the study help us better understand the relationship between the central agency problem and earnings management. This study represents a first attempt to examine empirical evidence on the relationship between the central agency problem and earnings management of the companies in Taiwan. The results obtained here should be of interest to investors, financial statement users, regulators, and the government.

参考文献 ( 76 ) 〈TOP〉

Chiou, J. R.,T. C. Hsiung,L. F. Kao(2002).A Study of the Relationship Between Financial Distress and Collateralized Shares.Taiwan Accounting Review,3(3),79-111.
连结：
高兰芬、邱正仁(2002)。董监事股权质押对会计盈余与股票报酬相关性之影响。台大管理论丛，13(1)，127-162。
连结：
Abbott, L. J.,Y. Park,S. Parker(2000).The Effects of Audit Committee Activity and Independence on Corporate Fraud.Managerial Finance.
Ashbaugh, H,R. LaFond,B.W. Mayhew(2003).Do Nonaudit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? Further Evidence.The Accounting Review,78(3),611-639.
Baber, W. R,K. R. Kumar,T. Verghese(1995).Client Security Price Reactions to the Laventhol and Horwath Bankruptcy.Journal of Accounting Research,33(2),385-395.

被引用文献 ( 5 ) 〈TOP〉

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